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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
THREE ESSAYS ON CREDIT MARKETS AND THE MACROECONOMY
Historically, credit market conditions have been shown to impact economic activity,
at times severely. For instance, in the late 2000s, the United States experienced a
financial crisis that seized domestic and foreign credit markets. The ensuing lack
of access to credit brought about a steep decline in output and a sluggish recovery.
Accordingly, policymakers commonly take steps to mitigate the effects of adverse
credit market conditions and, at times, conduct unconventional monetary policy once
traditional policy tools become ineffective. This dissertation is a collection of essays
regarding monetary policy, the flow of credit, financial crises, and the macroeconomy.
Specifically, I describe monetary policy’s impact on the allocation of credit in the
U.S. and analyze the role of upstream and downstream credit conditions and finan-
cial crises on international trade in a global supply chain.
The first chapter assesses the impact of monetary policy shocks on credit realloca-
tion and evaluates the importance of theoretical transmission mechanisms. Compus-
tat data covering 1974 through 2017 is used to compute quarterly measures of credit
flows. I find that expansionary monetary policy is associated with positive long-term
credit creation and credit reallocation. These impacts are larger for long-term credit
and for credit of financially constrained firms and firms that are perceived as risky
to the lender. This is predicted by the balance sheet channel of monetary policy and
mechanisms that reduce lenders’ risk perceptions and increase the tendency to search
for yield. Furthermore, I find that, on average, the largest increases in credit creation
resulting from monetary expansion are to firms that exhibit relatively low investment
efficiency. These estimation results suggest that expansionary monetary policy may
have a negative impact on future economic growth.
The second chapter evaluates the quantitative effects of unconventional monetary
policy in the late 2000s and early 2010s. This was a period when the traditional mon-
etary policy tool (the federal funds rate) was constrained by the zero lower bound.
We compute credit flow measures using Compustat data, and we employ a factor aug-
mented vector autoregression to analyze unconventional monetary policy’s impact on
the allocation of credit during the zero lower bound period. By employing policy
counterfactuals, we find that unconventional monetary policy has a positive and si-
multaneous impact on credit creation and credit destruction and these impacts are
larger in long-term credit markets. Applying this technique to analyze the flows of
financially constrained and non-financially constrained borrowing firms, we find that
unconventional monetary policy operates through the easing of collateral constraints
because these effects are larger for small firms or those with high default probabili-
ties. During the zero lower bound period, we also find that unconventional monetary
policy brings about increases in credit creation for firms of relatively high investment
efficiency.
The third chapter pertains to the global trade collapse of the late 2000s. This col-
lapse was due, in part, to strained credit markets and the vulnerability of exporters to
adverse credit market conditions. The chapter evaluates the impact of upstream and
downstream credit conditions and the differential effects of financial crises on bilateral
trade. I find that upstream and downstream sectors’ needs for external financing is
negatively associated with trade flows when the exporting or importing country’s cost
of credit is high. However, I find that this effect is dampened for downstream sectors.
I also find that downstream sectors’ value of collateral is positively associated with
trade when the cost of credit is high in the importing country. High downstream
trade credit dependence coupled with high costs of credit in the importing country
also cause declines in imports. There are amplifying effects of credit costs for sectors
that are highly dependent on external financing when the importing or exporting
country is in financial crisis. Further, the magnitude is larger when the exporting
country is in financial crisis. Finally, I find that these effects on trade flows are large
when the exporting country is a developed economy, but they are muted for develop-
ing economies.
KEYWORDS: Credit Constraints; Credit Reallocation; Financial Crisis; Interna-
tional Trade; Monetary Policy Transmission; Zero Lower Bound
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Chapter 1 Introduction
In the late 2000s, the U.S. experienced a severe financial crisis, which had far-
reaching impacts on economic activity. In the U.S., the tightening of credit mar-
kets caused a deep and prolonged recession. Other developed economies experienced
similar declines in output, including collapses in international trade due to strained
credit conditions domestically and abroad. Accordingly, extraordinary policy steps
were taken to ease financial markets and unfreeze credit markets. Beyond traditional
monetary policy, the Federal Reserve and other Central Banks provided further ac-
commodation through forward guidance and large-scale asset purchases.
A large body of literature has emerged regarding monetary policy’s impact on
certain macroeconomic outcomes. Still, little is known about how traditional and
unconventional monetary policy tools impact the allocation of credit of borrowing
firms. Macroeconomic theory suggests that monetary policy will impact the compo-
sition of borrowing firms’ credit and lenders’ loan portfolios. In this dissertation, I
analyze the impact of traditional and unconventional monetary policy on the flows
of credit of borrowing firms. In addition, I describe the impacts of the cost of credit,
vulnerability of sectors to upstream and downstream credit conditions, and financial
crises on international trade.
In the first chapter, I examine the role of monetary policy on the allocation of
credit among borrowing firms. Macroeconomic theory implies that credit will be
reshuffled amongst borrowing firms in response to monetary policy shocks. For ex-
ample, a monetary easing shock inflates the values of firms’ assets, which firms can
pledge as collateral for external financing. Accordingly, previously credit constrained
firms become able to pledge this collateral, leading to a flow of credit to such firms.
Alternatively, monetary easing, in lowering lenders’ yields, will cause lenders to lend
1
to increasingly risky borrowers to achieve previous returns. While a robust empirical
literature regarding monetary policy and credit markets exists, an underdeveloped
topic is the allocation of credit brought about by monetary policy.
I use data from Compustat to compute measures of credit creation and destruc-
tion for publicly traded firms over the period 1974:Q1–2017:Q1. I also group firms
by measures of financial constraints and create measures of credit creation and de-
struction for these groups of firms. Using a vector autoregression approach, I find
that monetary easing leads to leads to a substantial reallocation of credit, particu-
larly in long-term credit markets. Consistent with the balance sheet and risk-taking
channels of monetary policy, I find that monetary easing shocks cause credit creation
to increase relatively more for firms classified as financially constrained than non-
financially constrained. These results suggest that monetary policy operates through
channels that ease collateral constraints, reduce lenders’ perceptions of risk, and in-
crease the tendency to search for yield.
In the second chapter, we quantify the impact of unconventional monetary policy
on the allocation of credit during the period when the federal funds rate is at the zero
lower bound. In late 2008, the Federal Reserve lowered their policy instrument, the
federal funds rate, to a range between 0 and 0.25%, thus limiting the use of this rate
as a policy instrument. To ease credit markets and stimulate the economy, the Federal
Reserve resorted to unconventional policy steps such as large-scale asset purchases
and engaged in forward guidance to manage expectations of future policy actions. In
recent years, researchers have begun quantifying the impact of this unconventional
monetary policy, however the literature does not account for the allocation of credit
among heterogenous groups of firms.
As in the first chapter, we compute measures of credit creation and destruction for
financially constrained and non-financially constrained firms using data from Compu-
stat. However, in this chapter, we incorporate these measures in estimating a factor
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augmented vector autoregression to measure the effect of monetary policy shocks on
the creation and destruction of credit of these firms. We use policy counterfactuals
that (1) shut down the monetary policy shock over the zero lower bound and (2) force
the monetary policy to operate such that it is constrained by the zero lower bound
to assess the impact of actual unconventional monetary policy. A key finding is that
unconventional monetary policy leads to relatively large increases in the long-term
credit creation of financially constrained firms. This suggest that, during the zero
lower bound, unconventional monetary policy operated through the easing of finan-
cial constraints. We also find that unconventional monetary policy caused an increase
in short- and long-term credit creation for highly productive firms, likely leading to
future capital formation and economic growth.
In the third chapter, I estimate the effects of upstream and downstream credit
conditions on international trade and the differential impacts during times of financial
crisis. In the late 2000s, trade flows, particularly in manufacturing sectors, collapsed
worldwide. This collapse coincided with financial crises occurring in the U.S. and
other developed economies. Prior research has shown that strained credit markets in
upstream sectors are a key factor in explaining the trade collapse in the U.S. during
the U.S. financial crisis. In this chapter, I expand the scope of prior studies and
analyze the impact of upstream and downstream financial conditions on international
trade and the differential impact during times of financial crisis in the importing and
exporting country.
I use bilateral trade data at the sector level for 40 countries over the period 1995–
2011, which is a period containing financial crises in Asian and Nordic countries in the
1990s and in the U.S. and European countries in the 2000s. I also use Compustat data
to measure sectors’ vulnerability to credit markets and interbank rates to measure
the cost of credit. Using a triple difference specification, I find that adverse credit
conditions in upstream and downstream sectors negatively impact international trade.
3
Further, these effects are amplified for sectors whose need for external financing is
high when the importing country or exporting country is in financial crisis. I also find
that the differential effect of exporters’ credit conditions when the exporting country
is in financial crisis is large and statistically significant when the exporting country
is a developed economy. Further, this differential effect is larger in magnitude if the
importing country is a developing economy.
4
Chapter 2 Monetary Policy and Credit Flows
2.1 Introduction
In neoclassical macroeconomic models without financial frictions, credit markets
are an afterthought; banks act as inconsequential intermediaries between owners and
ultimate users of capital (Jorgenson, 1963; Tobin, 1969). In such models, credit
markets are assumed to be fully efficient and capital flows to its most productive
use. Monetary policy impacts real economic activity through the “cost-of-capital”
channel alone (Bernanke, 2007). In reality, credit markets are not frictionless and can
severely affect economic activity. Modern models incorporate financial frictions and
have expanded monetary policy channels beyond those influencing market interest
rates and bank capital.1 That is, monetary policy impacts borrowing firms’ costs of
external financing2 and lending institutions’ tolerance and perception of risk.3
While there is a large body of literature investigating the effect of monetary policy
on credit market outcomes,4 a less explored aspect is policy’s impact on the realloca-
tion of credit among borrowing firms. Existing theory implies that the composition of
credit will adjust following a macroeconomic shock.5 Because outstanding credit fluc-
tuates and gets reshuffled to others, assessment of credit market conditions through
inspection of aggregate net credit changes alone is incomplete and potentially mis-
leading. For instance, if credit extended to one firm increases by 10% but as the result
1See Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Kashyap and Stein (1994).
2See Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
3See Borio and Zhu (2012), Adrian and Shin (2010), Bruno and Shin (2015), Gambacorta (2009),
and Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, and Suarez (2017).
4See Ramey (2016) for an overview of recent studies.
5See for instance, models of homogeneous firms with heterogeneity investment project profitabil-
ity (Matsuyama, 2007) or heterogeneity in firm quality (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1994).
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of a 10% decrease in credit to another, then the net credit change is zero. Yet, credit
has been reshuffled between these two firms. Such reallocation may have important
implications for future capital formation and growth (Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti,
2014). Thus, an assessment of monetary policy’s impact on credit markets ought to
account for this reallocation.
The objective of this chapter is to explore the effect of monetary policy shocks on
the allocation of credit. Following Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2011), I use Compu-
stat North America data to compute credit flows for borrowing firms. Using Com-
pustat has several advantages. First, credit extended by nonbanks like private equity
firms, investment banks, or insurance companies is included in the data.6 Second,
Compustat data contains relevant characteristics of the borrowing firm, which can
be used to evaluate the importance of distinct monetary policy transmission mech-
anisms. For instance, credit flows may be larger and more fluid for firms that are
highly dependent on external financing. Therefore, the reallocation of credit among
these firms may be of a larger consequence for economic activity than those capable
of generating cash flow internally. An additional benefit of Compustat data is that
total debt is classified into its short- and long-term components.7 Typically, short-
term debt is used to provide cash flow rather than to finance long-term investment
projects. However, short-term, non-intermediated debt can be a relevant source of
bridge financing (Kahl, Shivdasani, and Wang, 2015). Further, as Guedes and Opler
(1996) document, borrowing (i.e. debt issuance) at both very short and long maturi-
ties are common features of large, highly rated firms, which produce a large portion
of the U.S. output.
6In 2007, the size of the non-bank lending was estimated to be 29.2 trillion U.S. dollars. As of
2015, the size increased to 34.2 trillion U.S. dollar (Financial Stability Board, 2017).
7Short-term debt includes bank acceptances, commercial paper, the current portion of long-term
debt, etc. Long-term debt includes loans, bonds, lines of credit, etc. maturing in more than one
year.
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Nevertheless, there are disadvantages to Compustat data. First, the data cannot
distinguish between the type of borrowing, other than whether it is short- or long-
term credit. Second, Compustat only includes information on publicly traded firms,
which tend to be large, developed firms. With Compustat, credit movement among
small, non-publicly traded firms is ultimately excluded. Over the period analyzed,
Compustat contains an average of 45 percent of U.S. non-financial sector total credit,
as reported by the Bank for International Settlements.8 The coverage has increased
over time, rising to an average of 64 percent since the first quarter of 2000. Even
though a substantial portion of credit is absent from Compustat, this data provides
a good testing ground for exploring the impact of monetary policy on overall credit
flows.
The topic of credit reallocation was first addressed by Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi
(2005) using bank lending data. They find that credit expansion and contraction
tend to co-move, specifically among banks of comparable size, loan type, and loca-
tion. Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2011) draw similar conclusions by analyzing firm
borrowing, rather than bank lending. They find that credit reallocation among bor-
rowing firms is intense, volatile, procyclical, and highly concentrated among firms of
comparable size, location, and industry. A connected study by Craig and Haubrich
(2013) investigates the substantial bank consolidation in the 1990s and analyzes credit
creation, destruction, and reallocation in and out of recessions. They observe that
credit creation is higher during expansions and that credit destruction is higher during
recessions.9
These studies either do not consider the impact of monetary policy on the real-
location of credit or do so only in a tangential manner. In this chapter, I show that
8http://www.bis.org/statistics/totcredit.htm
9Contessi, DiCecio, and Francis (2014) analyze credit reallocation on both sides - lending and
borrowing.
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monetary policy’s impact on credit flows is large and that the impact depends on
specific firm characteristics and the length of debt maturity. The responses are con-
sistent with parts of the balance sheet and risk-taking channels of monetary policy.
That is, in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock, credit tends to flow to
firms that are generally considered financially constrained or perceived as relatively
risky to the lender. Finally, I find the largest increases in the creation of credit due
to monetary easing shocks are of firms with relatively low investment efficiency.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the construction of
credit flows, as well as trends in the credit flow and monetary policy measures. Section
2.3 summarizes the theoretical background for the expected response of credit flows
to monetary policy and documents heterogeneity in credit flows. Section 2.4 outlines
the empirical framework and discusses the impact of monetary policy’s influence on
credit flows. Section 2.5 discusses implications for future growth and productivity
and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Data Construction and Description
Credit Flows
As in Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2011), I compute measures of inter-firm credit
flows starting from the balance sheets of all publicly traded U.S. firms reported in
Compustat North America. Firms in the “finance, insurance, and real estate” industry
groups are removed from the sample given that the aim of this study regards the
impact of monetary policy on the less-studied firms that demand credit, instead of
those that create credit. I largely follow the definition and measurement of credit flows
as in Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2011). In particular, (i) the unit of observation
is the firm, as Compustat does not provide data on firms’ individual projects; (ii) I
exclude accounts payable by suppliers from the measure of debt; (iii) I exclude firms
for whom the ratio of end-of-period gross capital to end-of-period net capital exceeds
8
120% to control for existing firms that enter the data-set;10 and (iv) only exits due
to merger, acquisition, liquidation, or bankruptcy are treated as credit subtractions.
In this chapter, I employ quarterly data spanning the period between the first
quarter of 1974 and the first quarter of 2017.11 The use of quarterly data, instead
of annual, as in Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2011), allows for clearer identification
of monetary policy shocks. Furthermore, the lengthy period covered by Compustat
allows for the use of structural vector autoregression (SVAR) tools such as historical
decomposition when studying the impact of monetary policy (see Kilian and Lütke-
pohl (2017)).
The quarterly rate of debt growth, git, for firm i in quarter t is given by
git =
debtit − debtit−1
(debtit + debtit−1)/2
. (2.1)
This transformation measures a symmetric and bounded growth rate around zero,
thus allowing for a unified treatment of continuing, newborn and dying firms (Davis
and Haltiwanger, 1992; Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti, 2011). In particular, git ∈ [−2, 2]
where −2 corresponds to debt growth of firms that died in the current year, and 2
corresponds to debt growth of newborn firms.
With this rate of growth, I compute aggregate credit creation and destruction for
a set of firms s in quarter t as the debt-weighted sum of the rates for expanding or
entering firms and the debt-weighted sum of the rates for contracting or exiting firms,
respectively. Specifically, aggregate credit creation for group s in time t (POSst) is
defined as
POSst =
∑
git>0,i∈st
git
(
debtit
debtst
)
. (2.2)
10See Ramey and Shapiro (1998) for the use of a similar criteria applied to flows of physical
capital and Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2011) for a detailed description.
11Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2011) analyze a period between 1954 and 2007.
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Similarly, aggregate credit destruction for group s in time t (NEGst) is defined as
NEGst =
∑
git<0,i∈st
|git|
(
debtit
debtst
)
. (2.3)
The first panel of Figure 2.1 plots credit creation and destruction for all publicly
traded firms from the first quarter of 1974 through the first quarter of 2017. These
two credit flow measures follow dissimilar patterns. Credit creation is highest in the
late 1980s, a period when credit destruction is near its mean growth rate. In the late
2000s, credit destruction falls from 5.9 in the third quarter of 2005 to 2.2 percent in
the fourth quarter of 2007 once the recession officially begins. Over the same period,
credit creation increases from 5.4 percent to 10.3 percent.
I compute gross credit reallocation as the sum of credit creation and destruction
(SUMst = POSst +NEGst) and net credit change by subtracting credit destruction
from credit creation (NETst = POSst−NEGst), shown in the second panel of Figure
2.1. Analysis of net credit changes alone may provide an incomplete depiction of
the market because it masks the reallocation of credit. For instance, though credit
reallocation is high in the late-1990s and early-2000s; these are periods of moderate
net credit changes.
I measure excess credit reallocation as the credit reallocation in excess of what is
required to accommodate net credit changes (EXCst = SUMst − |NETst|). Large
movements in credit reallocation can occur due to large increases in either credit
creation or destruction. For example, suppose credit creation increases 10%, but
credit destruction is unchanged. In this scenario, credit reallocation is 10%, but no
credit was truly reallocated from one borrower to another as excess credit reallocation
equals zero. In other words, the change in NET and SUM are equivalent. In a more
fluid credit market, excess credit reallocation rises with simultaneously expanding and
contracting credit. As the second panel of Figure 2.1 shows, excess credit reallocation
is consistently non-zero, with an upward trend until the late 1990s. Since then, excess
10
credit reallocation has trended downward.
Table 2.1 provides further detail on these five measures by decade. In line with
the findings of Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2011), credit reallocation is consistently
large and far exceeds what is needed to accommodate net credit changes, particularly
in the 1990s and 2000s. This table also shows that credit creation and destruction
are quite volatile. Until the 2010s, the volatility of credit creation exceeds that of
credit destruction. In the 2010s, credit destruction’s volatility exceeds the volatility
of credit creation. It is important to note that the magnitudes of these flows are
not directly comparable with those of Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2011) because I
use quarterly rather than annual measures. Further, reliable quarterly data is only
available from Compustat starting in the early 1970s.12
Monetary Policy Measure, Short-Term Debt, and Long-Term Debt
Empirical investigations into the effect of monetary policy on economic activity
have commonly identified the federal funds rate as the primary monetary policy in-
strument. However, from December 2008 until December 2015, the federal funds rate
was effectively at the zero lower bound (ZLB), thus limiting the use of the instrument
to stimulate the economy and invalidating its use as the monetary policy variable in
SVARs over this period. An alternative measure of the monetary policy stance at the
ZLB is proposed by Wu and Xia (2016), who develop an approximation to the forward
rate in the multifactor shadow rate term structure model. This can be used to replace
the effective federal funds rate in SVARs. They find that unconventional monetary
policy has a non-trivial impact on economic activity once the ZLB is reached. Con-
sequently, this measure has become popular in the literature employing SVARs over
the ZLB (see Anderson, Malin, Nakamura, Simester, and Steinsson (2017); Mumtaz
12See the Appendix for a description of credit flows using annual growth rates that more closely
resemble the measures in Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2011).
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and Surico (2018)). Figure 2.2 plots the effective federal funds rate along with the
shadow rate during the ZLB.13 In my analysis, I employ the effective federal funds
rate as the measure of monetary policy, but I replace it with the Wu-Xia shadow rate
during the ZLB period.
Figure 2.3 plots the long- and short-term credit flow measures,14 respectively,
along with the monetary policy rate. During the monetary easing of the financial
crisis, while long-term credit creation falls once easing starts, it is flat beginning in
the early 2010s. Similarly, long-term credit destruction is flat prior to, and following
this easing. Short-term credit creation and destruction increase in the early 1990s, as
policy rates are relatively low. Because credit flow and monetary policy measures are
endogenous, a SVAR approach is utilized to measure the effect of monetary shocks
on credit flows.
2.3 The Role of Monetary Policy and the Flow of Credit
In this section, I discuss relevent channels of monetary policy and how the alloca-
tion of credit ought to respond to monetary easing shocks. A traditional mechanism
through which monetary policy is transmitted to real economic activity is through the
supply of loans. That is, during times of expansionary monetary policy, banks have
more reserves to lend to firms, leading to capital formation. Accordingly, following
monetary policy easing, credit creation is expected to increase. Following analysis on
job reallocation by Davis and Haltiwanger (2001), I consider this an “aggregate chan-
nel,” as it mainly impacts the total amount of credit in the economy. This contrasts
with “allocative channels,” which alter the flow of credit to correct the mismatch
between actual and desired credit positions of lenders and borrowers. The reshuffling
13Similar models that aim to capture monetary policy during the ZLB include Krippner (2012)
and Bauer and Rudebusch (2016). See the Appendix for a comparison of these measures.
14That is, credit creation, credit destruction, net credit change, credit reallocation, and excess
credit reallocation.
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of credit that takes place through the allocative channel hinges on the existence of
firm heterogeneity.
Theoretical Underpinnings
The Balance Sheet Channel
There are three aspects to consider under the balance sheet channel - the cost
of external financing, collateral constraints, and cash flows. The two former aspects
follow Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1994), among others. If a firm’s borrowing is
constrained by the collateral they pledge, they pay an external finance premium above
the market interest rate.15 Expansionary monetary policy lowers external financing
costs by impacting market interest rates and asset values. The latter eases collateral
constraints, thereby lowering external finance premia.
Following monetary easing, net credit ought to increase as external financing be-
comes less costly. This results from an increase in credit creation, particularly for
collateral constrained firms. However, theory appears to be silent regarding policy’s
impact on credit destruction. It may increase as monetary policy enables firms to
better meet interest and principal debt payments or induces lenders to forgive debt.
Alternatively, credit may fall as loan defaults become less probable. When the change
in net credit is positive, an increase in credit creation cannot be offset by a similar
increase in credit destruction. Credit reallocation increases when both credit creation
and destruction rise. When monetary policy increases credit creation, the sign of the
impact on excess credit reallocation will correspond to that of credit destruction.
The third aspect of the balance sheet channel is related to firms’ cash flow (Mishkin,
1996). Interest expense on variable rate loans positively co-moves with the monetary
policy rate. Traditional monetary easing leads to lower variable rate interest expense
15An external finance premium is the agency premium that arises endogenously as the shadow
value of relaxing the collateral constraint in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1994).
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on loans whose rate is tied to short-term rates via the yield premium. Also, un-
conventional monetary policy that lowers long-term interest rates will increase firms’
cash flows because firms’ long-term variable interest expenses are impacted. These
policies lower the overall need for external financing to meet interest obligations. In
other words, credit creation ought to decrease, particularly for high debt service firms.
Credit destruction may increase or decrease for the same reasons as discussed through
the easing of collateral constraints. While the impact of monetary policy on net credit
and credit reallocation depends on the impact on credit destruction, the excess credit
reallocation ought to decrease.
The Risk-Taking Channel
Monetary policy may also impact economic activity through the risk-taking chan-
nel.16 A lender’s credit risk tolerance and the ease by which they price credit risk
are sensitive to monetary policy. For example, during the 2000s, interest rates in
the U.S. were considered by many as “too low for too long” (Taylor, 2009). Even
Federal Reserve officials expressed concern over the dangers of keeping policy rates
unnecessarily low in the aftermath of the financial crisis (Bullard, 2015). Extended
periods of excessively low interest rates may cause asset bubbles and financial sector
instability as banks engage in excessive risk-taking.
In times of monetary easing, lenders may engage in “searching for yield” in which
the allocation of loans in a lender’s portfolio shifts towards high risk, high return loans
(Rajan, 2006). Nominal return targets are slow to adjust downward when market in-
terest rates fall. To achieve previous returns, lenders are incented to reallocate the
risk composition toward riskier borrowers. This implies that credit creation increases
in aggregate and credit destruction increases as lenders reshuffle credit to reallocate
16See Borio and Zhu (2012), Adrian and Shin (2010), Bruno and Shin (2015), Gambacorta (2009),
and Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, and Suarez (2017).
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their risk compositions. However, credit destruction may also decrease as default is
less likely. When both measures increase, credit reallocation and excess credit reallo-
cation also increase. Through this mechanism, net credit should rise if the increase
in credit creation is not offset by a sufficiently large increase in credit destruction.
The second component of the risk-taking channel is the risk perception mecha-
nism (Borio and Zhu, 2012). This mechanism is related to the balance sheet channel,
although it operates through fundamental changes in lenders’ risk perceptions, rather
than through collateral constraints and agency premia. Monetary easing inflates asset
prices and decreases volatility, which tends to lower lenders’ perceptions of credit risk
(Gambacorta, 2009). In other words, following monetary easing, the marginal bor-
rower, who may not have met previous lending standards, may appear creditworthy,
even if their relative riskiness is unchanged.
This mechanism implies that credit creation and net credit increase in response
to a monetary easing shock. Although, the response of credit destruction is unclear.
Credit reallocation will increase when credit destruction does not decrease by a larger
magnitude than the increase in credit creation. The sign of the impact on excess
reallocation will correspond to that of credit destruction.
The final mechanism is described by Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, and Suarez (2017) as
the “risk-shifting” channel. Bank liabilities, such as wholesale funding and bank
deposits, become less costly when monetary policy lowers market interest rates. This
increases lenders’ margins and induces lenders to shift their allocation of loans away
from high risk lending. As opposed to searching for yield, this implies an increase in
credit for relatively less risky borrowing. To accommodate shifting loan portfolios,
credit destruction is more likely to increase,17 specifically for risky firms. Like the
17Recall that credit destruction may increase through loan repayment or decrease through fewer
defaults. Through this channel, the impact of the former is more likely, although the net impact on
credit destruction is ambiguous.
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other risk-taking mechanisms, I expect an increase in net credit change and credit
creation, but the impacts on credit destruction, credit reallocation, and excess credit
reallocation are ambiguous.
Measuring Heterogeneity
To examine the importance of these channels in the transmission of monetary
policy shocks to credit flows, I must first effectively group firms by relevant charac-
teristics. For the balance sheet channel, firms are classified by their degree of financial
constraints and debt service. For the risk-taking channel, firms should be grouped by
lenders’ risk perceptions of the borrowing firm. Since information on these percep-
tions is not available, I group firms by characteristics that may reflect perceived risk:
default probability, asset size, financial dependence, and debt service.
Table 2.2 shows the number of quarter-firm observations in each grouping. While
certain groups may have similar characteristics, these categories do highlight distinct
aspects of firms. To illustrate, of the nearly 150,000 observations of high default
probability firms across time, the majority are low debt service, non-financially de-
pendent, and small firms. The former two are typical characteristics of non-financially
constrained firms, and the latter is a characteristic of financially constrained firms.
Next, I briefly discuss the measures of heterogeneity and describe asymmetries in
credit flows of these groups.
Financial Constraints and Perceived Riskiness
Researchers have attempted to quantify firms’ financial constraints in equity and
debt markets in recent years.18 These measures are typically created by analyz-
ing firms’ annual reports (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997), structural modeling (Whited
18See Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016) for a survey of the literature regarding the measurement
of financial constraints.
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and Wu, 2006), whether a firm has a credit rating (Almeida, Campello, and Weis-
bach, 2004), or whether they pay a dividend (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988;
Almeida and Campello, 2007). Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016) find that firms
classified as financially constrained by such measures, to a greater extent, are young
firms in the growth phase of their life cycle, rather than truly financially constrained
firms. Further, they find that firms close to default behave as if they are truly fi-
nancially constrained.19 Therefore, I group firms by their default probability. This
not only identifies firms more highly constrained in credit markets, which is relevant
for the balance sheet channel, but also those that are perceived as relatively risky
borrowers, which is relevant for the risk-taking channel.
Corporate default risk is constructed as in Merton (1974) whereby
DDit = Distance− to− defaultit =
log(Eit+Fit
Fit
) + rit − 0.5σ2it
σit
(2.4)
where
Eit =
|prccq| × cshoq
103 (2.5)
Fit = dlcq +
1
2dlttq (2.6)
σit = [
E
E + F × σE,it] + [
F
E + F × (0.05 + 0.25× σE,it)] (2.7)
and σE,it is the rolling one-year standard deviation of prccq (stock price), rit is the
year-over-year stock return, dlttq is total long-term debt, dlcq is short-term debt, and
cshoq is common shares outstanding. Following Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016),
19They also find that private firms behave as if they are financially constrained. Compustat only
contains income statement and balance sheet data for publicly traded firms, therefore, I do not group
firms by whether they are publicly traded.
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firms whose probability of default exceeds 25 percent from the cumulative standard
normal distribution function are high default probability firms and all others are low
default probability firms.
Table 2.3 shows that long-term credit creation, credit destruction, net credit
change, credit reallocation, and excess credit reallocation are significantly higher and
more volatile for high default probability firms. Short-term credit flow measures for
both groups of firms are similar to one another, on average. It is important to note
that credit measures are constructed by growth rates and even if these rates are higher,
the dollar amount of credit created or destroyed is lower than total credit flows of low
default probability firms. For instance, over this period, the average share of aggre-
gate credit for all high default probability firms is 6.8 percent. Further, the default
probability threshold is static and depending on overall conditions, the number of
firms considered high or low default probability fluctuates. In the third quarter of
2008, at the height of the financial crisis, over 28 percent of firms are classified as high
default probability firms as compared to just above 4 percent in the fourth quarter
of 1978.
Debt Service
I group firms by their leverage ratio (total debt as a percentage of total assets)
to measure debt service. I classify a firm as high debt service if its leverage ratio
falls in the top tercile of firms in a quarter, and as low debt service if their leverage
ratio falls in the bottom tercile in a quarter.20 Kudlyak and Sanchez (2017) find
that during the late 2000s recession, low leverage firms’ short-term net credit fell
relatively more than high leverage firms. This is consistent with an explanation by
Calomiris and Himmelberg (1995), who argue that low leverage firms are financially
20Kudlyak and Sanchez (2017) limit their analysis to manufacturing firms as in Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994).
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constrained because external financing is overly costly to obtain in response to adverse
macroeconomic shocks.
From Table 2.3, short- and long-term credit creation and destruction are, on
average, substantially larger for low debt service firms. Recall that these measures
are weighted sums of debt growth rates. Accordingly, low debt service firms may
choose to hold little or no debt, thereby having little or zero weight on the group
credit measures. Therefore, growth rates of a small number of low debt service firms
are utilized in creating group credit flow measures.21
Firm Size
In relation to the balance sheet channel, the size of a firm ought to coincide with
the degree to which they are collateral constrained. This is shown empirically by
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), who find that during periods of tight credit, that small
manufacturing firms are impacted more than large firms. The topic was re-examined
by Kudlyak and Sanchez (2017), who find that credit contracted relatively more for
large firms during the late 2000s recession.
I classify firms whose value of their assets fall in the top tercile as large and those
in the bottom tercile as small. Table 2.3 shows credit flow measures for these two
groups. Credit creation and destruction are higher for small firms, noting again that
the dollar amount of credit is likely higher, on average, for large firms. As a result,
credit reallocation and excess credit reallocation is larger for small firms and this
holds for short- and long-term credit flows.
21In Compustat, 4.22 percent of quarter-firm observations report no holdings of debt.
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Financial Dependence
In general, obtaining external financing is costlier than generating cash flow in-
ternally through operations. Therefore, firms that are highly dependent on external
financing are more likely to be impacted by fluctuating credit market conditions.
Through the balance sheet channel, if financially dependent firms are also financially
constrained (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Kudlyak and Sanchez, 2017), then they are
susceptible to shocks in the same manner. A widely used measure of financial de-
pendence comes from Rajan and Zingales (1998) in their influential study of the link
between financial dependence and economic growth. This measure is the ratio of cap-
ital spending less cash flow from operation to capital spending. I classify financially
dependent firms as those whose ratio is in the top tercile, while those in the bottom
tercile are non-financially dependent.
As shown in Table 2.3, both short- and long-term credit destruction is higher for
financially dependent firms. Credit creation of the two groups are similar, especially
of long-term credit. Credit reallocation is significantly larger for financially dependent
firms, specifically for short-term credit, but excess credit reallocation is significantly
larger in both short- and long-term credit for financially dependent firms.
2.4 Monetary Policy Shocks and Credit Flows
Empirical Strategy
To analyze monetary policy’s impact on credit flows, I utilize a SVAR, represented
as
A0Yt = a+
n∑
j=1
AjYt−j + ut. (2.8)
where the vector, Yt, includes a block of macroeconomic variables (real GDP, un-
employment, consumer prices), the monetary policy rate (the effective federal funds
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rate supplemented by Wu and Xia (2016) shadow rate during the ZLB period), and
a block of credit flow measures (credit destruction and creation), with this ordering.
The A matrices are matrices of coefficients, a is a vector of constants, and ut is a
vector of structural innovations.
This methodology is comparable to Craig and Haubrich (2013), who specify a VAR
with a block of macroeconomic variables, the federal funds rate, and a block of loan
flows. However, the specification used in this chapter differs in two aspects. First,
to account for the “price puzzle,” whereby consumer prices respond unexpectedly to
a monetary policy shock, I follow Estrella (2015). I impose a zero restriction on the
coefficient of the first quarter lag of the monetary policy rate on consumer prices. For
full identification, the A−10 matrix is assumed to be lower triangular. Through these
restrictions, monetary policy does not directly impact the current or the following
period’s consumer prices.22 The method utilized by Estrella (2015) is motivated by
theoretical analogs of identities for aggregate supply, aggregate demand, and a mon-
etary policy rule. Because I impose the restriction on the lagged coefficient matrix,
ordinary least squares equation by equation does not produce efficient estimates of the
VAR parameters. Hence, I estimate the VAR via iterated seemingly unrelated regres-
sion (SUR), which is equivalent to full information maximum likelihood (Hamilton,
1994).
Second, I order credit destruction before credit creation in Yt by an assumption
that credit creation responds contemporaneously to credit destruction, but not vice
versa. This assumption is motivated by the likely ability of borrowers to respond
quickly to a credit destruction shock, whereas adjustment of credit destruction to a
22Alternative approaches to account for the price puzzle are including commodity prices in
the VAR to capture internal information on inflation expectations (For instance, see Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) and Craig and Haubrich (2013)), utilizing a factor-augmented VAR
(Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz, 2005) to account for monetary policymakers’ internal information
relevant for monetary policy, or including an omitted variable, the output gap, in a misspecified
VAR (Giordani, 2004).
21
credit creation shock would take time to implement. That is, firms can quickly draw
upon existing credit, but the impact of the shock on credit destruction through the
maturation or repayment of existing credit is likely to take longer to materialize. Yet,
the results are robust to the alternative ordering.
To study the effect across groups of firms, I include an additional block of group
credit flows in Yt. This VAR is estimated separately for total, short-, and long-term
credit flows by rotating credit creation and destruction as the final block in Yt. The
results of the VAR are summarized below.
The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks for All Publicly Traded Firms
To start, the VAR is estimated using credit flow measures of all publicly traded
firms. Figure 2.4 shows the impulse responses of Yt to a one-time, unexpected decrease
of 100 basis points in the monetary policy rate.23 In response to the shock, real GDP
increases with a lag, remaining persistently high, while the unemployment rate falls
and remains persistently low. While consumer prices fall beyond the first quarter, the
statistical significance is eliminated at a 10 percent significance level. Further, the
response of consumer prices to this shock relative to a VAR without the restriction
as in Estrella (2015), is muted.
Following the monetary policy shock, credit creation increases significantly at
quarters 6-12, increasing over 0.10 percentage points at each quarter. The response
of credit destruction is larger than credit creation and statistically significant on
impact and in the first quarter following the shock. From quarters 5 through 13, the
response of credit creation is statistically significant, but smaller compared to credit
creation, rising roughly 0.05 percentage points per quarter. The impulse responses of
net credit change and excess credit reallocation are plotted in the first panel of Figure
23The error bands are the 68 percent mean-bias-corrected residual-based wild bootstrap interval
with 2,500 repetitions.
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2.5. Because there are notable increases in credit creation and destruction at multiple
horizons, credit creation is large and significant at many horizons. The response of
net credit is negative and significant on impact as well as 7-12 quarters following the
shock. The impact on excess credit reallocation is like that of the net credit change.
The second and third panels of Figure 2.5 plot the responses of long- and short-
term credit flows to the monetary policy shock. Like the responses of total credit,
long-term credit creation and destruction exhibit statistically significant increases, al-
though the magnitudes are larger. The monetary policy shock also positively impacts
the long-term net credit change, credit reallocation, and excess credit reallocation.
This simultaneous increase in credit creation and destruction is an example of the
reallocation process whereby firms receive long-term credit to pay off existing loans -
a “cleansing”effect.
Short-term credit destruction increases a statistically significant 0.1 percentage
points in the second quarter following the shock. However, contrary to the responses
of long-term credit flows, short-term credit destruction falls significantly at longer
horizons. Recall that looser monetary policy may lead to fewer loan defaults, resulting
in a decrease in credit destruction. It may also lead to a higher likelihood of loan
repayment on aggregate, in which case, credit destruction will increase. The change
in the sign of the impact of the monetary policy shock on credit destruction suggests
that monetary policy’s influence on loan defaults outweighs the impact on repayment
of short-term loans over longer horizons. The impact of the shock on credit creation
is not statistically significant.
Heterogeneity in Responses of Credit Flows to Monetary Policy Shocks
Table 2.4 provides the cumulative impulse responses at 4, 8, and 12 quarters for the
subsets of firms described in Section 2.3. Of the subsets, credit creation significantly
increases for high default probability and small firms after 12 quarters following the
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shock, rising 1.40 and 0.28 percentage points, respectively. Considering that the
average total credit reallocation for high default probability firms is 7.54 percentage
points, this is non-trivial. The increase is disproportionately larger than the 0.47
percentage point increase for low default probability firms, which is not statistically
significant. While I find that the increase in credit creation is larger in magnitude
than small firms, the response is not statistically significant for large firms. Credit
reallocation increases significantly only at 8 quarter horizons and for high debt service
and small firm subsets, rising 0.93 and 0.33 percentage points, respectively.
For all firms’ total credit, there is a statistically significant and persistent cu-
mulative increase in credit reallocation by 8 following the shock. The increase is
larger and remains statistically significant for long-term credit reallocation as shown
in the second panel of Table 2.4. By 8 quarters following the shock, long-term credit
reallocation increases 1.15 percentage points. By 12 quarters, the increase is 2.10
percentage points. These are due to statistically significant increases in credit de-
struction and creation at 8 quarters and a statistically significant increase in credit
creation at 12 quarters. Also, as the second and third panels of Table 2.4 show,
significant increases in credit reallocation at any horizons only occurs for long-term
credit. The largest statistically significant increases in long-term credit reallocation
at these horizons tend to occur for high default probability firms, small firms, and
high debt service firms.
For both long- and short-term excess credit reallocation, the response is typi-
cally, although not exclusively, negative. The largest significant decrease in excess
credit reallocation is -11.26 percentage points for non-financially dependent firms in
short-term credit, while the largest increase is 0.51 percentage points for low default
probability firms in long-term credit. Because excess credit reallocation tends to fall,
the amount of credit reallocation needed to accommodate net credit changes is large.
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Implications for Credit Channels of Monetary Policy
These results highlight that monetary policy at least operates through the aggre-
gate channel by increasing credit creation.24 By decomposing the responses of credit
reallocation into the contributions from credit creation and destruction, I am also able
to shed light on the allocative impact of monetary policy through the aforementioned
channels.
All Publicly Traded Firms
Recall that in response to the monetary easing shock, credit creation and destruc-
tion increase for total and long-term credit. Credit destruction tends to increase and
remain persistently high for long-term credit only and decrease for short-term credit
at longer horizons.
For long-term credit, the results are consistent with the collateral constraint and
the searching for yield mechanism of the balance sheet channel and some mechanisms
of the risk-taking channel. While theory is clear that credit creation should increase
due to these mechanisms, the impact on credit destruction is unclear, consistent with
these results. From the cash flow mechanism, credit creation should fall as variable
interest expenses fall. Because neither short- nor long-term credit creation fall in
response to the shock, there is no support for this mechanism. By grouping firms and
analyzing their impulse responses, I can provide clearer evidence for these channels,
if it exists.
Default Probability Grouping
Recall that the searching for yield mechanism predicts that credit creation should
increase for risky (e.g. high default probability) firms. Further, through the risk
24Specifically for long-term credit.
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perceptions mechanism, credit creation should increase relatively more for these firms.
These predictions are confirmed in total and long-term credit because the increase in
credit creation is positive and statistically significant for high default probability firms.
Increases in total credit creation for low default probability firms are not statistically
significant, but the increases in long-term credit creation are significant. However,
they are substantially smaller in magnitude compared to high default probability
firms as shown in Table 2.4 . Further, theory implies that monetary policy plays an
allocative role by reshuffling credit between high and low default probability firms.
This is confirmed in long-term credit at all horizons as credit destruction increases
for low default probability only.
The risk-shifting channel predicts that lenders will extend relatively more credit
to low default probability firms as monetary easing indirectly shrinks lender margins.
While long-term credit creation increases at 8 and 12 quarter horizons, they are
substantially smaller than the increases for high default probability firms. Therefore,
I do not find support for this as a relevant channel of monetary policy.
By the balance sheet channel, following monetary policy easing, financially con-
strained firms ought to experience a relatively larger increase in credit creation. Fur-
ther, while the impact on credit destruction is ambiguous, theory predicts that mon-
etary policy should increase net credit. If default probabilities effectively group firms
by their degree of financial constraints as Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016) find,
then the responses of total and long-term credit creation, destruction, net credit,
credit reallocation, and excess credit reallocation are all consistent with this theory.
Debt Service Grouping
If high debt service firms are financially constrained, then, as with high default
probability and financially dependent firms, theory implies that credit creation ought
to increase following a monetary policy easing shock that eases financing constraints.
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An alternative explanation regards monetary policy’s impact on a firm’s balance sheet
through impacting variable rate interest expense. By this mechanism, the monetary
policy shock will lead to a decrease in credit creation for high debt service firms as
their variable interest expense falls. From Table 2.4, only short-term credit creation
increases significantly by 4 quarters following the monetary policy easing shock, ris-
ing 1.64 percentage points. These results do not support the mechanism regarding
variable rate interest payments being relevant for monetary policy’s transmission.
Asset Size Grouping
By the searching for yield and risk perceptions mechanisms, credit creation ought
to increase proportionately more for small firms following a monetary policy easing
shock, since they tend to be perceived as riskier. There are no statistically significant
increases in credit creation for large firms. For small firms, the only statistically
significant increase in credit creation is a 0.28 percentage point increase 12 quarters
after the shock. These results provide little evidence for the balance sheet or risk-
taking channels. Further, because credit creation of large firms does not increase
significantly, these results also do not provide support for the risk-shifting channel.
Financial Dependence Grouping
Long-term cumulative credit creation decreases 0.12 percentage 8 quarters follow-
ing the shock but increases 0.70 percentage points after 12 quarters. At these horizons,
there is no statistically significant change in credit creation for non-financially depen-
dent firms. The increase in credit creation for financially dependent firms is consistent
with the collateral constraint mechanism of the balance sheet channel. While this pro-
vides support for the channel, it is possible that this financial dependence ratio may
not effectively group firms by their degree of financial constraints as the results from
Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016) suggest.
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Historical Decompositions
Historical decompositions show how much of the fluctuations of the endogenous
variables in the system are caused by the individual structural innovations. Consider
the SVAR in (2.8). If Yt is covariance stationary, then its value in t is a function of
previous structural innovations, which also pre-date the initial period. Because the
effects of old innovations are small, an innocuous approximation of Yt is
Yt ≈ Ŷt = b+
t−1∑
s=0
θsut−s. (2.9)
The structural MA coefficient matrices, (θ0, θ1, ... ,θT−1), are responses of each
element in Yt to a single ut shock at the horizon h = 1, 2, ..., H, so
∂Yt=h
∂u′t
= θh (2.10)
where θh is a (K×K) matrix. K is the number of variables and therefore the number
of structural innovation series in the VAR. Each element of the θh is a (H × H)
impulse response matrix.
Figure 2.6 shows the cumulative contribution of monetary policy innovations to
the creation and destruction of credit for different subsets of firms across time. For
subset of firms, the contributions of credit creation and destruction from monetary
policy shocks follow similar patterns. This shows that monetary policy shocks tend
to influence credit reallocation and excess reallocation, but the net credit change will
be close to zero.
The contributions to credit creation and destruction are highest in the late 1970s
and lowest in the early- to mid-1980s. Further, increases in credit creation and de-
struction due to monetary policy shocks tend to be negative or near zero during the
Federal Reserve’s conducted rounds of quantitative easing (2009–2014). It was not
until monetary policy began to unwind in 2015 that the contribution from monetary
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policy to these credit flow measures tended to increase.
2.5 Credit Flows and Investment Efficiency
So far, this chapter has focused on the response of firm credit flows to monetary
policy shocks. Yet, ultimately the question of interest for policymakers and academics
regards whether monetary policy aids or hinders the reallocation of credit from less
productive to more productive firms. Because Compustat does not provide detail on
investment projects, I am not able to determine if credit is used to finance efficient
projects. However, I can classify firms by their overall investment efficiency using an
index by Galindo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss (2007). This index is constructed as
Iit =
salesit
capitalit
debtit
debtst
salesit−1
capitalit−1
debtit−1
debtst−1
. (2.11)
Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2014) utilize this index to test the impact of inter-
state financial deregulation on states’ productivity growth through the reallocation of
credit. This ratio exceeds one when the debt-weighted sales as a percentage of capital
(a proxy for investment efficiency) is growing.
Table 2.5 shows the mean and standard deviation of this index for subsets of
firm across time.25 From this table, it is unclear if investment efficiency tends to be
higher for risky and financially constrained firms. Investment efficiency is smallest,
on average, for high default probability firms, but is largest for high debt service
firms. Nevertheless, as Figure 2.6 shows, the contribution of monetary policy shocks
to credit creation was highest in the 1970s for large firms, high debt service firms, and
low default probability firms. During this time, as Table 2.5, investment efficiency is
relatively high for low default probability firms and high leverage firms, however, it
is relatively low for large firms.
25The top and bottom 1 percent of indexes are trimmed in the calculation of these statistics.
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Credit reallocation will be most beneficial in terms of future productivity growth
when credit is contracted from inefficient projects and is instead extended to efficient
projects. However, on average, the lowest investment efficiency subset is firms with
high default probabilities, whose mean index was as low as 0.985 in the 2000s. As
shown in Table 2.4, monetary easing shocks lead to large and significant increases
in long-term credit creation for these firms. This implies that monetary easing may
have an adverse impact on future capital formation. However, there is also a large
and statistically significant increase in short-term credit creation for high debt service
firms and a large and statistically significant increase in long-term credit for financially
dependent firms. These firms, conversely, have relatively higher investment efficiency
than low debt service firms and non-financially dependent firms, respectively.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter shows that monetary policy easing leads to substantial reallocation
of credit amongst firms. This impact is large for high default probability firms in long-
term credit. However, the impact is also present to a lesser extent for small firms and
financially dependent firms in long-term credit and for high debt service firms in short-
term credit. These results are consistent with the easing of collateral constraints that
ensues by a monetary expansion, as purported by the balance sheet channel. Yet, such
behavior is also implied by the searching for yield and risk perceptions mechanisms
of the risk-taking channel.
While I find strong evidence for the relevance of these channels of monetary policy,
I do not find support for the cash flow mechanism as a pertinent channel of monetary
policy. Monetary easing does not lead to credit creation decreases for high debt
service firms. Also, I do not find support that the risk-shifting mechanism is relevant
because credit does not flow to firms of relatively low perceived riskiness to the lender.
These results have important implications for future growth and productivity.
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While I find that credit creation significantly increases for high default probability
firms following a monetary easing shock, these firms also have the lowest investment
efficiency of any subsets of firms. However, investment efficiency is relatively high
for high debt service firms, financially dependent firms, and small firms whom also
tend to experience increases in credit creation following a monetary easing shock.
Therefore, it is unclear whether monetary policy has an overall positive or negative
impact on future capital formation.
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2.7 Tables
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Quarterly Credit Flow Measures
Average Coefficient of variation
NEG POS NET SUM EXC NEG POS NET SUM EXC
1974:Q1–1979:Q4 2.66 3.86 1.21 6.52 5.07 14.39 55.50 188.12 31.91 11.05
1980:Q1–1989:Q4 3.43 6.17 2.74 9.60 6.70 19.25 48.59 106.40 33.53 19.21
1990:Q1–1999:Q4 3.93 5.89 1.96 9.82 7.79 25.91 28.75 64.79 25.34 25.92
2000:Q1–2009:Q4 4.19 5.93 1.75 10.12 8.17 24.88 28.29 110.44 19.97 22.40
2010:Q1–2017:Q1 2.97 4.26 1.29 7.23 5.74 22.69 16.12 87.92 10.47 19.50
Note: This table reports averages and coefficients of variation of total credit flow measures for all publicly
traded firms. POS refers to credit creation, NEG is credit destruction, NET is net credit change (NETst =
POSst − NEGst), SUM is credit reallocation (SUMst = POSst + NEGst), and EXC is excess credit
reallocation (EXCst = SUMst − |NETst|).
Table 2.2: Frequency of Quarter-Firm Observations
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Low default probability 625,925 0
High default probability 0 143,986
Low debt service 124,610 124,405 295,641 0
High debt service 243,317 5,525 0 295,643
Large 232,392 32,445 41,203 131,131 297,219 0
Small 187,287 50,884 136,975 80,093 0 297,219
Non-financially dependent 164,329 46,680 84,357 67,458 71,966 74,991 243,231 0
Financially dependent 156,348 34,413 74,096 85,462 67,113 87,433 0 243,230
Note: This table shows the number of quarter-firm observations per group over the period 1974:Q1–2017:Q1.
Firms are subset by their default probability following Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016), whereby firms for
which the default probability exceeds 25 percent at a point in time are considered high default probability
firms and all others are low default probability firms. High debt service firms are those for which the leverage
ratio is in the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and small firms are those for which their leverage ratio
is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter. Financially dependent firms are those for which the ratio
of capital spending less operating cash flow as a percentage of capital spending (Rajan and Zingales, 1998)
is in the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and non-financially dependent firms are those for which the
ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics of Credit Measures by Subset
Average
Total credit Short-term credit Long-term credit
NEG POS NET SUM EXC NEG POS NET SUM EXC NEG POS NET SUM EXC
All firms 3.54 5.42 1.88 8.96 6.91 7.05 15.11 8.05 22.16 14.06 3.61 5.90 2.29 9.51 7.13
High default probability 4.43 7.54 3.12 11.97 6.75 7.87 15.84 7.97 23.71 13.63 4.23 8.50 4.26 12.73 6.64
Low default probability 3.63 5.17 1.54 8.80 6.99 7.14 15.11 7.97 22.24 14.23 3.72 5.62 1.90 9.34 7.25
[0.0622] [0.0000] [0.0170] [0.0000] [0.4497] [0.1114] [0.3615] [0.9961] [0.1247] [0.3503] [0.1698] [0.0000] [0.0029] [0.0000] [0.0342]
High debt service 3.02 5.53 2.51 8.56 5.94 6.22 15.09 8.87 21.30 12.43 3.34 6.17 2.83 9.51 6.61
Low debt service 11.65 7.44 -4.21 19.09 13.24 8.30 7.31 -0.99 15.61 11.57 9.47 20.46 10.98 29.93 18.25
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.1106] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Large 3.40 5.29 1.89 8.69 6.64 6.87 14.73 7.86 21.60 13.67 3.51 5.76 2.25 9.27 6.92
Small 9.75 12.27 2.52 22.02 18.30 13.09 24.16 11.08 37.25 25.93 8.48 16.41 7.93 24.89 16.80
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0846] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Financially dependent 5.16 6.85 1.69 12.01 8.25 8.69 18.36 9.67 27.05 16.00 5.03 7.08 2.05 12.11 8.19
Non-financially dependent 3.67 6.10 2.43 9.77 6.19 7.28 16.30 9.02 23.58 13.12 3.75 7.02 3.27 10.77 6.47
[0.0000] [0.1351] [0.2175] [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0053] [0.0668] [0.6063] [0.0037] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.9245] [0.0980] [0.0602] [0.0000]
Coefficient of variation
Total credit Short-term credit Long-term credit
NEG POS NET SUM EXC NEG POS NET SUM EXC NEG POS NET SUM EXC
All firms 27.96 40.63 111.09 30.11 27.34 23.38 30.36 56.57 23.34 22.67 32.67 41.63 94.28 33.55 32.62
High default probability 123.98 79.88 270.27 65.77 53.88 73.01 58.39 133.42 46.97 56.10 112.06 98.83 238.75 71.29 45.35
Low default probability 30.72 37.45 122.95 28.74 27.90 25.48 34.17 64.87 25.91 24.93 33.60 37.75 95.35 31.83 32.07
High debt service 36.73 52.16 113.49 38.78 36.70 31.17 43.29 12.12 74.46 31.17 40.01 50.55 10.54 90.56 40.21
Low debt service 42.90 72.09 -143.30 44.14 58.67 64.69 60.76 -609.54 49.97 50.80 58.02 54.98 98.33 46.87 54.11
Large 30.24 42.59 113.34 31.90 29.44 23.87 31.49 59.36 23.90 22.93 34.85 43.64 98.37 35.33 34.81
Small 27.08 29.84 170.12 21.48 22.84 28.17 21.02 56.50 16.89 25.89 26.92 32.16 69.59 23.99 26.14
Financially dependent 58.30 71.87 356.15 45.90 39.97 45.15 58.15 122.95 40.05 41.84 69.70 79.93 333.97 53.28 44.81
Non-financially dependent 64.55 71.60 208.85 49.80 51.67 72.61 62.26 129.33 47.58 51.79 60.61 90.67 207.16 62.63 53.96
Note: This table reports averages, p-values of a two-sided t-test for mean equivalence in brackets, and coefficients of variation for subsets of firms. Firms are
subset by their default probability following Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016), whereby firms for which the default probability exceeds 25 percent at a point in
time are considered high default probability firms and all others are low default probability firms. High debt service firms are those for which the leverage ratio is
in the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and small firms are those for which their leverage ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter. Financially
dependent firms are those for which the ratio of capital spending less operating cash flow as a percentage of capital spending (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) is in the
top tercile of firms in a given quarter and non-financially dependent firms are those for which the ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter.
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Table 2.4: Cumulative Impulse Responses of Credit Flows to a Monetary Policy
Easing Shock
Total credit
After 4 quarters After 8 quarters After 12 quarters
NEG POS NET SUM EXC NEG POS NET SUM EXC NEG POS NET SUM EXC
All firms 0.27 -0.17 -0.43 0.09 -0.49 0.50 0.38 -0.13 0.85 -0.10 0.73 0.94 0.23 1.64 0.31
High default probability 1.38 -0.30 -1.53 0.93 -1.53 1.47 0.65 -0.71 1.92 -1.55 1.02 1.40 0.61 2.16 -2.49
Low default probability 0.06 -0.20 -0.26 -0.11 -0.60 0.21 0.14 -0.06 0.37 -0.40 0.39 0.47 0.09 0.89 -0.09
High debt service 0.39 -0.28 -0.69 0.10 -0.72 0.81 0.12 -0.73 0.93 -0.25 1.21 0.49 -0.71 1.69 0.24
Low debt service -0.02 -0.76 -0.83 -0.76 -2.29 -0.12 -0.95 -0.92 -1.13 -3.31 -0.19 -0.46 -0.31 -0.69 -3.56
Large 0.62 0.21 -0.36 0.90 -0.31 1.00 1.44 0.48 2.49 0.44 1.24 2.10 0.86 3.41 0.91
Small -0.27 -0.09 0.21 -0.25 -1.45 -0.17 0.34 0.54 0.33 -1.55 0.28 0.28 0.07 0.63 -1.81
Financially dependent -0.94 -0.20 0.82 -1.05 -2.52 -1.13 -0.08 1.10 -1.14 -3.19 -1.02 0.37 1.36 -0.54 -3.09
Non-financially dependent 0.40 -1.78 -2.22 -1.60 -4.04 0.43 -2.10 -2.58 -1.86 -4.84 0.63 -2.23 -2.93 -1.75 -5.13
Long-term credit
After 4 quarters After 8 quarters After 12 quarters
NEG POS NET SUM EXC NEG POS NET SUM EXC NEG POS NET SUM EXC
All firms 0.31 -0.08 -0.43 0.24 -0.42 0.63 0.53 -0.17 1.15 0.13 0.91 1.21 0.26 2.10 0.67
High default probability 1.15 1.07 -0.19 2.07 -0.50 1.20 2.85 1.42 3.86 -0.43 0.79 4.14 3.23 4.59 -1.27
Low default probability 0.28 -0.32 -0.64 0.01 -0.69 0.67 0.09 -0.64 0.81 -0.09 0.99 0.72 -0.36 1.78 0.51
High debt service 0.27 -0.18 -0.49 0.09 -0.59 0.85 0.34 -0.53 1.15 0.13 1.36 0.86 -0.47 2.16 0.90
Low debt service 0.27 -3.96 -4.41 -3.84 -8.09 0.01 -4.69 -4.76 -4.91 -10.05 0.01 -4.14 -4.19 -4.41 -10.34
Large 0.90 -0.97 -1.74 -0.04 -2.30 1.49 0.09 -1.30 1.61 -1.38 1.83 0.71 -0.94 2.54 -0.90
Small 0.30 0.79 0.46 1.13 -0.32 0.40 1.70 1.19 2.18 -0.26 0.78 1.58 0.63 2.45 -0.63
Financially dependent -1.08 -0.53 0.61 -1.59 -2.90 -0.97 -0.12 0.97 -1.06 -2.87 -0.69 0.70 1.51 0.08 -2.37
Non-financially dependent 0.42 -1.89 -2.33 -1.43 -3.87 0.77 -1.96 -2.80 -1.16 -4.16 1.25 -1.78 -3.09 -0.52 -3.94
Short-term credit
After 4 quarters After 8 quarters After 12 quarters
NEG POS NET SUM EXC NEG POS NET SUM EXC NEG POS NET SUM EXC
All firms -0.04 0.34 0.41 0.27 -0.52 -0.55 0.59 1.19 0.00 -1.74 -0.86 0.41 1.34 -0.47 -2.72
High default probability 1.22 0.44 -0.52 1.67 -0.68 1.18 -0.06 -1.03 1.15 -2.26 1.05 -0.73 -1.56 0.20 -4.11
Low default probability -0.20 0.47 0.71 0.26 -1.10 -0.89 0.66 1.62 -0.19 -2.72 -1.45 0.36 1.81 -0.99 -4.26
High debt service -0.02 1.64 1.74 1.57 -0.60 -0.53 2.24 2.91 1.68 -1.81 -0.75 1.95 2.90 1.17 -2.99
Low debt service -2.53 -1.18 1.34 -3.68 -5.34 -3.59 -1.71 1.93 -5.30 -7.63 -3.40 -1.69 1.73 -5.18 -7.87
Large 0.03 1.86 1.75 1.94 -1.65 -0.15 7.05 7.32 6.82 -2.24 -0.02 9.43 9.45 9.37 -2.14
Small 0.35 0.22 -0.21 0.42 -1.14 1.07 0.78 -0.46 1.69 -0.51 1.73 1.23 -0.69 2.86 0.04
Financially dependent -0.84 0.01 0.72 -0.59 -4.54 -1.89 -0.93 0.87 -2.66 -7.67 -2.19 -1.07 1.12 -3.14 -8.77
Non-financially dependent -0.37 -2.17 -1.98 -2.32 -5.33 -1.10 -3.77 -2.99 -4.61 -8.89 -1.57 -4.84 -3.54 -6.10 -11.26
Note: This table shows the cumulative percentage point response of credit flows to a -100 basis point mon-
etary policy shock. The impulse responses are derived from a VAR that includes a block of macroeconomic
variables, the shadow federal funds rate, and two credit flow measures. It includes a constant and two lags, as
chosen by BIC. Bold responses are those that fall within the 68 percent mean-bias-corrected residual-based
wild bootstrap interval. Firms are subset by their default probability following Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist
(2016), whereby firms for which the default probability exceeds 25 percent at a point in time are considered
high default probability firms and all others are low default probability firms. High debt service firms are
those for which the leverage ratio is in the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and small firms are those for
which their leverage ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter. Financially dependent firms
are those for which the ratio of capital spending less operating cash flow as a percentage of capital spending
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998) is in the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and non-financially dependent
firms are those for which the ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter.
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Table 2.5: Heterogeneity of Investment Efficiency
High default probability Low default probability
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
1974:Q1–1979:Q4 1.033 0.345 1.041 0.308
1980:Q1–1989:Q4 1.022 0.429 1.059 0.437
1990:Q1–1999:Q4 1.003 0.480 1.076 0.462
2000:Q1–2009:Q4 0.985 0.444 1.071 0.469
2010:Q1–2017:Q1 1.017 0.428 1.072 0.457
High debt service Low debt service
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
1974:Q1–1979:Q4 1.057 0.301 1.025 0.359
1980:Q1–1989:Q4 1.091 0.458 1.021 0.476
1990:Q1–1999:Q4 1.095 0.446 1.011 0.538
2000:Q1–2009:Q4 1.088 0.448 0.983 0.529
2010:Q1–2017:Q1 1.088 0.448 0.991 0.519
Large Small
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
1974:Q1–1979:Q4 1.033 0.244 1.045 0.359
1980:Q1–1989:Q4 1.039 0.357 1.087 0.544
1990:Q1–1999:Q4 1.054 0.376 1.100 0.581
2000:Q1–2009:Q4 1.042 0.367 1.115 0.606
2010:Q1–2017:Q1 1.041 0.342 1.144 0.646
Financially dependent Non-financially dependent
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
1974:Q1–1979:Q4 1.054 0.280 1.035 0.291
1980:Q1–1989:Q4 1.103 0.544 1.055 0.460
1990:Q1–1999:Q4 1.098 0.516 1.069 0.479
2000:Q1–2009:Q4 1.080 0.495 1.062 0.477
2010:Q1–2017:Q1 1.083 0.485 1.074 0.467
Note: This table provides the averages and standard deviation of the investment efficiency index (Galindo,
Schiantarelli, and Weiss, 2007) by subsets of firms across time. The index is the change in debt-weighted
sales as a percentage of capital, where the top and bottom one percent are trimmed in calculation of
these statistics. Firms are subset by their default probability following Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016),
whereby firms for which the default probability exceeds 25 percent at a point in time are considered high
default probability firms and all others are low default probability firms. High debt service firms are those
for which the leverage ratio is in the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and small firms are those for
which their leverage ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter. Financially dependent firms
are those for which the ratio of capital spending less operating cash flow as a percentage of capital spending
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998) is in the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and non-financially dependent
firms are those for which the ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter.
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2.8 Figures
Figure 2.1: Total Credit Measures of All Publicly Traded Firms
Note: POS refers to credit creation, NEG is credit destruction, NET is net credit change (NETst =
POSst −NEGst), SUM is credit reallocation (SUMst = POSst +NEGst), and EXC is excess credit real-
location (EXCst = SUMst − |NETst|) for total credit for all firms. Shaded bars indicate NBER recessions.
Figure 2.2: The Shadow Rate and Effective Federal Funds Rate
Note: The effective federal funds rate comes from the Federal Reserve Board’s H.15 release and the Wu Xia
shadow rate comes from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Shaded bars indicate NBER recessions.
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Figure 2.3: The Monetary Policy Rate and Credit Flow Measures
a) Short-term credit
b) Long-term credit
Note: This monetary policy rate is the effective federal funds rate during normal times, but the Wu-Xia
during the zero lower bound period. Shaded bars indicate NBER recessions.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Responses to an Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock
Note: These graphs plot quarterly impulse responses to a -100 basis point monetary policy shock. The
impulse responses are derived from a VAR that includes a block of macroeconomic variables, the monetary
policy rate, and two credit flow measures. It includes a constant and two lags, chosen by BIC. The bands
represent the 68 percent mean-bias-corrected residual-based wild bootstrap interval.
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Figure 2.5: Impulse Responses of Credit Flows to an Expansionary Monetary Policy
Shock
Total credit
Long-term credit
Short-term credit
Note: These graphs plot quarterly impulse responses to a -100 basis point monetary policy shock. The
impulse responses are derived from a VAR that includes a block of macroeconomic variables, the mone-
tary policy rate, and two credit flow measures. It includes a constant and two lags, chosen by BIC. The
dots indicate 68 percent statistical significance using the mean-bias-corrected residual-based wild bootstrap
method.
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Figure 2.6: Historical Contribution of Monetary Policy Shocks to Credit Flows
Note: These graphs shows the cumulative historical contribution of monetary shocks to credit flow measures.
These results are derived from a VAR that includes a block of macroeconomic variables, the monetary policy
rate, two aggregate credit flow measures, and two group credit flow measures. The VAR includes a constant
and two lags, chosen by BIC. High default probability firms are those for which the default probability
exceeds 25 percent at a point in time. High debt service firms are those for which the quarterly leverage
ratio falls in the top tercile of firms. Large firms’ total assets fall in the top tercile of firms. Financially
dependent firms are those for which the quarterly need for external financing falls in the top tercile of firms.
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Chapter 3 The Effect of Unconventional Monetary Policy on the
Creation and Destruction of Credit
joint with Ana María Herrera
3.1 Introduction
In December 2008, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) established a
target range for the federal funds rate of 0 to 0.25%. In the following years, with
this rate effectively at the zero lower bound (ZLB), the Federal Reserve resorted to
unconventional policy methods to stimulate the economy. By November 2014, the
Federal Reserve purchased nearly $4 trillion of mortgage-backed securities, agency
debt, and long-term U.S. Treasuries. Moreover, throughout the ZLB, Federal Reserve
officials engaged in forward guidance to shape expectations of the course of future
monetary policy. These unprecedented actions were intended to ease strained financial
markets, which were hampering economic growth due to tight credit standards. In
this chapter, we evaluate the impact of these policies on the allocation of credit among
firms during the ZLB.
Empirically assessing the effect of unconventional monetary policy has proved to
be difficult for policymakers and academics alike. A notable challenge has been the
measurement of monetary policy once the ZLB is reached. However, in recent years,
researchers have developed methods to account for the Federal Reserve’s large-scale
asset purchases and forward guidance in quantifying the stance of U.S. monetary pol-
icy (Krippner, 2012; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2016; Wu and Xia, 2016). In particular,
Wu and Xia (2016) employ a factor augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) in
the spirit of Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) to investigate the impact of uncon-
ventional monetary policy on unemployment, industrial production, consumer prices,
capacity utilization, and housing starts. They find that monetary policy actions taken
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during the ZLB lowered the unemployment rate by 1 percentage point more than if
the Federal Reserve followed a Taylor rule. While an analysis of monetary policy’s
impact on credit markets is absent from their study, their method is appropriate to
assess the allocation of credit among borrowing firms.
During the Great Recession and the start of the ZLB period, certain borrowers
were more adversely impacted than others. This is documented by Kudlyak and
Sanchez (2017), who revisit an earlier empirical study by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)
to show that short-term credit of small firms declined substantially less than the
credit of large firms during the 2008–09 period. This result is surprising because
small firms typically have relatively fewer assets than large firms to pledge as col-
lateral for external financing. By this constraint, small firms are more susceptible
to adverse macroeconomic conditions (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist, 1999). Kudlyak and Sanchez (2017) conclude that the tightening of
collateral constraints did not play a notable role in describing credit markets of bor-
rowing firms during the Great Recession. However, from their analysis, it is unclear
whether unconventional monetary policy was effective at easing these constraints dur-
ing the ZLB. Accordingly, we estimate the impact of these policies on credit flows of
financially constrained and non-financially constrained firms during the ZLB.
Using firm-level Compustat data, Kudlyak and Sanchez (2017) show that median
short-term net credit changes are negative in the 2008–09 period. In other words, the
median firm’s dollar amount of credit destruction exceeds credit creation. Borrowing
firms’ credit holdings can decrease, for instance, through debt repayment, matu-
ration, default, or forgiveness. As this occurs, lenders have more funds to extend
to other borrowers that may have distinctive characteristics. For example, during
an economic downturn, lenders may choose to extend credit to higher quality, non-
financially constrained firms that are better able to pledge collateral for external
financing (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1994). To measure credit flows of bor-
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rowing firms, we follow Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2011) and construct separate
measures of aggregate credit creation and destruction. We also construct credit flow
measures for financially constrained and non-financially constrained groups of firms.
Next, we analyze the impact of unconventional monetary policy separately on these
flows of credit to uncover how policy actions cause credit to reshuffle amongst firms
during the ZLB.
We find that unconventional monetary policy had a positive impact on aggregate
credit creation and destruction of borrowing firms during the ZLB, specifically in long-
term credit. During quantitative easing, our results suggest that the Federal Reserve
positively impacted credit markets through the easing of firms’ credit constraints.
That is, actual increases in credit creation caused by unconventional monetary policy
were markedly larger for financially constrained firms. This was most evident for the
long-term credit of small firms or those with high default probabilities. We also find
that unconventional monetary policy prompted substantial flows of credit to relatively
productive firms during the ZLB.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data used in analysis
and the evolution of credit flows during the ZLB. Section 3.3 describes the empirical
methodology. Section 3.4 provides the results of the counterfactual analysis during
the ZLB, including the rounds of quantitative easing and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data Description
Credit Flows
As in Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2011) (hereafter HKM), we compute measures
of inter-firm credit flows starting from the balance sheets and income statements of all
publicly traded U.S. firms reported in the Standard and Poor’s Full-Coverage Compu-
stat tapes. Firms in finance, insurance, and real estate industry sectors are removed
from the sample given our aim to study the impact of unconventional monetary pol-
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icy on the (less studied) firms that demand credit, instead of firms that create credit.
Using this data to study the effect of monetary policy shocks on credit reallocation
presents some advantages and shortcomings. A clear shortcoming is that Compustat
only includes publicly traded firms, which tend to be large. Thus, small private firms
that have been found to exhibit larger declines in short-term credit and sales than
large firms when faced by tighter monetary policy (see Gertler and Gilchrist (1994))
are excluded. However, recent work by Kudlyak and Sanchez (2017) finds that large
firms exhibited a greater contraction in sales and short-term credit than small firms
in 2008–09. This finding suggests that understanding how credit is reallocated among
large firms is essential in evaluating the impact of unconventional monetary policy
during and after the Great Recession. However, a key advantage of Compustat is
the lengthy period of time covered in the data. This allows us to use structural vec-
tor autoregression (SVAR) tools such as historical decomposition when studying the
impact of monetary policy (see Kilian and Lütkepohl (2017)).
We follow HKM’s definition and measurement of credit flows in most aspects. In
particular: (i) our unit of observation is the firm, as we do not have data on the firm’s
individual projects; (ii) we exclude accounts payable by suppliers from the measure
of credit; (iii) we exclude firms for which the ratio of end-of-period gross capital to
end-of-period net capital exceeds 120% to control for existing firms that enter the
data-set;1 (iv) only exits due to merger or acquisition, liquidation or bankruptcy are
treated as credit subtractions.
We depart from HKM in using quarterly, instead of annual, data and we expand
the sample to include the ZLB.2 High frequencies over long periods allow for clearer
1See Ramey and Shapiro (1998) for the use of a similar criteria applied to flows of physical
capital and Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2011) for a detailed description.
2Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2011) compute annual credit flows using Compustat over the
period 1952–2007. Reliable quarterly data is only available from Compustat starting in the early
1970s. See the Appendix for descriptive statistics for annual credit flows that resemble those by
Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2011).
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identification of monetary policy shocks. We compute the rate of debt growth, git,
for firm i in quarter t as
git =
debtit − debtit−1
(debtit + debtit−1)/2
. (3.1)
This measure is symmetric around zero and bounded, thus allowing for a unified
treatment of continuing, newborn and dying firms (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992;
Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti, 2011). In particular, git ∈ [−2, 2], where −2 corresponds
to debt growth of firms that died in the current year and 2 is debt growth of newborn
firms.
With the rate of growth defined as above, we proceed to compute aggregate credit
creation and credit destruction for a set of firms s in quarter t. These are weighted
sum of the rates of debt growth for expanding or entering firms and the weighted sum
of the rates of debt growth for contracting or exiting firms, respectively. Specifically,
aggregate credit creation for group s in t (POSst) is defined as
POSst =
∑
git>0,i∈st
git
(
debtit
debtst
)
. (3.2)
Similarly, credit destruction (NEGst) is defined as
NEGst =
∑
git<0,i∈st
|git|
(
debtit
debtst
)
. (3.3)
Furthermore, we compute gross credit reallocation as the sum of credit creation
and credit destruction (SUMst = POSst +NEGst). We obtain net credit growth by
subtracting credit destruction from credit creation (NETst = POSst − NEGst) and
excess credit reallocation as EXCst = SUMst − |NETst|.
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Aggregate Credit Flows
We start by examining the magnitude and volatility of aggregate credit flows of
borrowing firms. Table 3.1 reports the average credit creation, destruction, realloca-
tion, net credit change, and excess credit reallocation for the 1974:Q1–2017:Q1 period.
From panel (a), average credit creation is 5.4% and credit destruction is 3.5%, amount-
ing to a net credit change of 1.9% and gross and excess credit reallocation of 9.0%
and 6.9%, respectively. This confirms HKM’s finding that the intensity of inter-firm
credit flows far exceeds the reallocation needed to accommodate net credit changes.
Also, the volatility of credit creation is substantially larger than credit destruction.
A possible explanation is that firms are better equipped to adjust the dollar amount
of credit upward over short periods of time. For instance, firms often draw upon lines
of credit with little or no notice, leading to more volatile credit creation.
A benefit of creating credit flow measures from firm-level data is that we can
separately analyze the allocation of short- and long-term credit of firms. Panels (b)
and (c) of Table 3.1 provides credit flow averages and coefficients of variation of short-
term3 and long-term credit. Average short-term credit creation and destruction are
notably higher than long-term creation and destruction. The relatively large short-
term credit destruction may stem from firms’ incentives to repay such credit as to
maintain their reputations as good borrowers (Diamond, 1989). Indeed, average short-
term credit creation and credit destruction over the period is 15.1 and 7.1 percent,
respectively, compared to 5.9 and 3.6 percent, respectively, for long-term credit.
3Short-term credit refers to credit maturing in less than 12 months and the portion of long-term
credit maturing in less than 12 months.
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Group Credit Flows
To explore the effect of monetary policy on the allocation of credit of firms with
varying degrees of financial constraints, we construct credit flows for certain subgroups
of borrowing firms. We begin by constructing alternative measures of financial con-
straints used in the extant literature. These are (i) asset size (Gertler and Gilchrist,
1994; Kudlyak and Sanchez, 2017), (ii) debt service (i.e. leverage) (Mishkin, 1996),
(iii) need for external financing (Rajan and Zingales, 1998), and (iv) default proba-
bilities (Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2016). A firm’s leverage ratio is that of total
debt to total assets. The need for external financing is a firm’s capital spending less
operating cash flow as a percentage of capital spending (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
Default probabilities are calculated following Merton (1974) such that
DDit = Distance− to− defaultit =
log(Eit+Fit
Fit
) + rit − 0.5σ2it
σit
(3.4)
where
Eit =
|prccq| × cshoq
103 (3.5)
Fit = dlcq +
1
2dlttq (3.6)
σit = [
E
E + F × σE,it] + [
F
E + F × (0.05 + 0.25× σE,it)] (3.7)
where σE,it is the rolling one-year standard deviation of prccq (stock price), rit is the
year-over-year stock return, dlttq is total long-term debt, dlcq is short-term debt, and
cshoq is common shares outstanding. Default probabilities are obtained from the
cumulative standard normal function.
We classify firms as financially constrained if a firm’s (i) assets value falls in the
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bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter, (ii) leverage ratio falls in the top tercile of
firms in a given quarter, (iii) need for external financing falls in the top tercile of firms
in a given quarter, or (iv) default probability exceeds 25 percent as in Farre-Mensa
and Ljungqvist (2016).4
Table 3.2 shows the percentage of time that firms are classified in specific groups
at time t, conditional on classifications in time t − 1. While these are alternative
measures of financial constraints, they do capture different aspects of firms. For
instance, default probabilities tend to fluctuate with equity prices and are therefore
noisy measures. If a firm is classified as having a high default probability in t − 1,
then it is likely to remain in the same group in t only 48.7 percent of the time. In
other words, a firm is more likely to be classified as having a low default probability
in t. However, a low default probability firm in t − 1 is substantially more likely to
remain a low default probability firm in t (88.7 percent) than becoming a high default
probability firm. Firms’ asset prices tend to be more stable across time, therefore,
firms that are classified as small in t− 1 are also small in t 80.6 percent of the time.
Of the remaining 19.4 percent, firms transition to large only 1.8 percent of the time.
In fact, small firms are less likely to remain small (80.6 percent) than large firms are
to remain large between t− 1 and t (84.9 percent).
Table 3.3 provides the change in the credit flow measures for financially con-
strained and non-financially constrained firms from 2009:Q3 through 2015:Q3, the
period after the recession when unconventional monetary policy was conducted. For
short-term maturities, the largest increase in net credit wass for high default prob-
ability firms (8.06 percentage points). For this group, credit creation increased 9.70
percentage points and credit destruction increased 1.64 percentage points. While
credit reallocation was high for these firms (11.34 percentage points), the intensity of
4Our empirical results are robust to alternatively grouping firms by default probability terciles.
These results are shown in the Appendix.
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credit reallocation, as measured by excess credit reallocation, did not increase sub-
stantially. This wass the result of a one-sided, rather than simultaneous and intense
increase in credit creation and credit destruction.
Recall that Kudlyak and Sanchez (2017) find that median short-term credit for
large firms contracted more than small firms during the Great Recession. After this
time and during the ZLB, short-term net credit of firms also increased relatively more
for those classified as large, rising 2.37 percentage points. Short-term net credit for
small firms decreased 0.62 percentage points. However, this decline in short-term net
credit masked the large and intense reallocation of short-term credit of these firms
occurring during the ZLB. Short-term credit creation of small firms increased 4.35
percentage points, but short-term credit destruction increased 4.97 percentage points.
While the short-term net credit change was negative, short-term credit reallocation
and excess credit reallocation were 9.32 and 8.70 percentage points, respectively. The
change in excess credit reallocation during this period was larger for small firms than
any other subset under analysis.
Small firms also experienced a large increase in long-term credit creation (9.96
percentage points) relative to large firms (-0.15 percentage points). Long-term credit
creation also increased disproportionately more for financially dependent firms (3.88
percentage points) and high default probability firms (4.64 percentage points). These
results are consistent with easing of collateral constraints that likely occurred during
the ZLB. However, we also find that long-term credit creation increased for low debt
service firms (3.73 percentage points) but decreased for high debt service firms (-0.38
percentage points). These results are not consistent with this channel of monetary
policy. However, credit destruction increased for high debt service firms, suggesting
that these firms engaged in deleveraging during the ZLB.
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Monetary Policy Measure
Empirical investigations into the effect of monetary policy shocks on economic
activity commonly identify the federal funds rate as the monetary policy instrument.
However, from December 2008 until December 2015, the federal funds rate was effec-
tively at the ZLB, thus limiting the use of the instrument to stimulate the economy
and invalidating its use as the monetary policy variable in SVARs. An alternative
measure of the monetary policy stance at the ZLB has been proposed by Wu and Xia
(2016), who develop an approximation to the forward rate in the multifactor shadow
rate term structure model. This rate can be used to replace the effective federal funds
rate in SVARs during the ZLB period. The Wu-Xia shadow rate has been shown to
work well in FAVAR models and their data is made available by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta. Thus, we employ the effective federal funds rate as our measure
of monetary policy, but we replace it with the Wu-Xia shadow rate during the ZLB
period.
Other Variables
As in Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005), we include a large set of economic
variables to capture the information available to Federal Reserve policymakers in
determining the course of monetary policy. The variables included in this study cover
broad markets such as labor, consumption, housing, exchange rates, etc. As in Wu
and Xia (2016), we utilize 97 of the 120 original series used by Bernanke, Boivin,
and Eliasz (2005), and we update these series beyond the ZLB, through 2017:Q1.
We also include aggregate credit creation and destruction measures, for a total of
99 series. Unless these variables are rates or indices, they are typically expressed as
logged differences to induce stationarity.
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3.3 Empirical Methodology
Kudlyak and Sanchez (2017) do not use an econometric model; rather, they ana-
lyze credit aggregates and median credit growth rates for subsets of borrowing firms
around NBER recession dates and “tight money dates” (Romer and Romer, 1989,
1990). To study the effect of monetary policy shocks, we utilize a FAVAR approach
as in Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005). We conduct policy counterfactuals like
Wu and Xia (2016) to quantify the direct effect that unconventional monetary policy
shocks had on credit flows during the ZLB.
Let rt be the observed monetary policy instrument and let Ft be a vector of
unobserved factors that jointly follow the vector autoregression:
Ft
rt
 = Φ(L)
Ft−1
rt−1
+ υt (3.8)
where Φ(L) is a lag polynomial and υt is mean zero with a covariance matrix, Q.
The unobserved factors are estimated from the large set of macroeconomic variables,
Xt, described in the previous section. The observed variables are related to the
unobserved factors and observed policy rate such that,
Xt = ΛFt + λrt + et (3.9)
where Λ is the matrix of factor loadings. From (3.9), we obtain F̂t to estimate the
FAVAR in (3.8), where we impose recursive restrictions that the factors respond to
the monetary policy shock with a lag. Following Wu and Xia (2016), we include three
estimated factors5 in the estimation of (3.8). We regress each macroeconomic variable
5The estimated factors are plotted in the Appendix.
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of interest6 on the observed policy rate and estimated factors using least squares to
obtain a b matrix.7 From b, we obtain the impulse responses at horizon h, expressed
as
Ψr,ih = bx
1
i
∂F 1t+h
∂υrt
+ bx2i
∂F 2t+h
∂υrt
+ bx3i
∂F 3t+h
∂υrt
+ bri
∂rt+h
∂υrt
(3.10)
where the partial derivatives are the impulse responses from the estimated FAVAR.
The variables of interest are a function of all past shocks and initial conditions.
Accordingly, we decompose each variable into the contributions of the shocks across
time. This allows us to construct policy counterfactuals to describe the path that
the economy would have taken had certain scenarios occurred as in Sims and Zha
(2006). We analyze the contribution of monetary policy shocks to credit creation and
destruction of borrowing firms over the period where the shadow rate was negative
(2009:Q3–2015:Q3). We apply two policy counterfactuals as in Wu and Xia (2016). In
the first counterfactual, we supplement the column of the matrix of structural shocks
that corresponds to the shadow federal funds rate with zero. In effect, this forces the
actual shadow federal funds rate to a hypothetical rate that is fully determined by
lags in the FAVAR during the counterfactual period. In other words, the monetary
shock is shut down. In the second counterfactual, we supplement the monetary policy
shock series with one that forces the shadow federal funds rate to the ZLB during the
counterfactual period. This is achieved by adding the difference between the observed
shadow rate and 0.25 to the monetary shock series. Doing so, we quantify how credit
flows would have responded had monetary policy been constrained by the ZLB. We
6As in Wu and Xia (2016), the variables of interest we use are the industrial production index,
consumer price index, capacity utilization, unemployment, and housing starts, in addition to the
credit flow measures.
7In this matrix, we impose restrictions that that the policy rate has no contemporaneous impact
on any variable in the system other than housing starts. In other words, all other variables of interest
are slow-moving (see Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) for the complete classification of fast- and
slow-moving variables).
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proceed by creating artificial historical decompositions that show the contributions of
these hypothetical monetary policy shocks to the creation and destruction of credit of
borrowing firms. As in Wu and Xia (2016), we create counterfactual wedges between
the actual and counterfactual values of the variables of interest at time τ such that
wedgeiτ = Y iτ −
τ∑
s=t1
Ψr,is υcfs (3.11)
where t1=2009:Q3. In the first counterfactual, we let υcfs = 0. In the second coun-
terfactual, we let υcfs = υs + 0.25− rs.
3.4 The Effect of Monetary Policy on Credit Flows at the Zero Lower
Bound
Figure 3.1 shows the impulse responses of the variables of interest to a -25 basis
point shock to the monetary policy rate. As in Wu and Xia (2016), we find quanti-
tatively similar increases in industrial production, capacity utilization, and housing
starts and decreases in unemployment and consumer prices following the shock. Also,
we find that aggregate credit creation and credit destruction of borrowing firms in-
crease in response to the shock. The response of credit destruction is statistically
significant between the second and eighth quarter following the easing shock and
the response of credit creation is statistically significant between the third and ninth
quarters following the shock. The increase in credit creation reaches over 4 percent,
while the increase in credit destruction just surpasses 2 percent. Credit reallocation
(that is, the sum of credit creation and destruction) accordingly increases over 6 per-
cent, while the net credit increases to roughly 2 percent over the horizon. Compustat
does not disclose why firms’ credit changes from one period to the next. However,
unconventional monetary policy may induce borrowers to deleverage (i.e. repay debt
or allow debt to mature), such as to reduce the overhang of debt (Eggertsson and
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Krugman, 2012).
Figure 3.2 plots the actual and counterfactual variables of interest as in Wu and
Xia (2016) and of total credit creation and credit destruction of firms. Had mone-
tary policy been conducted such that the monetary policy shock was shut down or
such that monetary policy was bounded by the ZLB, unemployment and consumer
prices would have been higher than observed. Also, industrial production, capacity
utilization, and housing starts are lower in the counterfactuals than observed. The
differences between the actual and counterfactual values of credit destruction are
similar. However, unconventional monetary policy leads to a substantial increase in
credit creation, specifically in the counterfactual bounding monetary policy to the
ZLB. In other words, had the Federal Reserve not implemented the policy observed
at the ZLB, credit creation among firms would have fallen.
The wedges between the actual and the counterfactual credit flows are reported
in Table 3.4. In both counterfactuals, unconventional monetary policy positively
impacted total credit reallocation as both observed credit creation and destruction
measures were higher than their counterfactual values. Total credit creation increased
0.20 percentage points and credit destruction increased 0.06 percentage points in
the first counterfactual; this results in a 0.26 percentage point increase in credit
reallocation. The impact was larger in the second counterfactual as actual credit
creation was 0.89 percentage points higher and credit destruction was 0.38 percentage
points higher than if monetary policy was bounded by the ZLB. The impacts of
unconventional monetary policy over this period were non-trivial, considering that
average credit creation and destruction are 5.4 and 3.5 percentage points, respectively,
over the whole period.
The positive impact of unconventional monetary policy shocks in the second coun-
terfactual on aggregate short-term credit creation was smaller in magnitude (0.51
percentage points) than on long-term credit creation (0.88 percentage points). Fur-
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ther, from Table 3.1, short-term credit flows are, on average, substantially higher
than long-term credit flows. While unconventional monetary policy caused long-term
credit destruction to increase, the impact on short-term credit destruction was a
decline of 0.26 percentage points.
Unconventional Monetary Policy’s Heterogenous Impact on Credit Flows
We repeat this analysis using credit creation and credit destruction for financially
constrained and non-financially constrained groups of firms as described in Section
3.2. We re-estimate the FAVAR with the addition of these measures in Yt, then we
compute the two counterfactuals during the ZLB.
We begin by analyzing the policy counterfactuals of financially dependent and
non-financially dependent firms, shown in Table 3.4. If financially dependent firms
are also financially constrained, then unconventional monetary policy ought to ease
these constraints, leading to relatively larger increases in credit creation than for
financially dependent firms. During the ZLB, unconventional monetary policy caused
increases in credit creation and credit destruction for both groups, relative to the
counterfactuals. However, as the results show, the increase in total credit creation
due to unconventional monetary policy was larger for non-financially dependent firms.
Additionally, in the second counterfactual, the increases in long-term credit creation
due to unconventional monetary policy are comparable for the two groups.
During the Great Recession, Kudlyak and Sanchez (2017) find that the median
decrease in short-term credit was relatively large for non-financially dependent firms.
As Table 3.4 highlights, during the ZLB, short-term credit creation of financially de-
pendent firms was 0.68 percentage points higher than if the monetary policy shock
was shut down, although the counterfactual credit destruction was only 0.09 percent-
age points higher for these firms. This amounts to a 0.59 percentage point net credit
increase during the ZLB relative to the first counterfactual, compared to a mere 0.01
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percentage point net credit increase for non-financially dependent firms. However, in
the second counterfactual, both credit creation and destruction fell relative to what
would have occurred had the Federal Reserve been constrained by the ZLB. Yet, the
net credit change for financially dependent firms was positive (0.11 percentage points),
whereas the net credit change for non-financially dependent firms was negative (-0.14
percentage points).
Next, we examine monetary policy counterfactuals for high and low default prob-
ability firms. Total credit creation increased 1.26 percentage points for high default
probability firms and 0.89 percentage points for low default probability firms com-
pared to if the Federal Reserve was constrained by the ZLB. Further, actual credit
destruction was 0.79 percentage points higher for high default probability firms and
0.44 percentage points higher for low default probability firms compared to the coun-
terfactual. These amount to nearly identical net credit changes for these groups of
firms. However, actual monetary policy induced a far larger and more intense credit
reallocation for high default probability firms during the ZLB. These effects were
present for long-term credit flows, however short-term credit creation fell for high
default probability firms. These differences in counterfactual credit flows during the
ZLB suggests that unconventional monetary policy was effective at easing collateral
constraints for long-term credit.
Table 3.4 summarizes the results of the counterfactuals for small and large firms.
As the table shows, monetary policy at the ZLB caused increases in short-term credit
creation for large and small firms. Actual short-term credit creation increased 1.07
percentage points for small firms compared to if monetary policy was constrained by
the ZLB. The increase in short-term credit creation for large firms was only 0.21 per-
centage points. This suggest that unconventional monetary policy operated through
the easing of firms’ financial constraints for short-term credit.
Lastly, we analyze the counterfactual credit flows of high and low debt service
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firms. According to Calomiris and Himmelberg (1995), high debt service firms are
those for which external financing is overly costly and marginally difficult to obtain
(that is, they are financially constrained). As displayed in Table 3.4, for both short-
and long-term credit of borrowing firms, unconventional monetary policy caused large
increases in credit creation for high debt service firms. Relative to policy that was
constrained by the ZLB, short-term credit creation of high debt service firms increased
0.94 percentage points and this group’s long-term credit increased 1.18 percentage
points. A comparison of the actual credit flows to those if the monetary policy
shock was shut down shows that credit creation increased for high debt service firms
but fell for low debt service firms. It is important to note that low debt service
firms hold little or no debt whatsoever, and by our classification, 4.22 percent of
quarter-firm observations in Compustat report no holdings of debt. Accordingly,
each firm considered as low debt service that has positive debt receives a relatively
large weight in the overall measure of credit creation and destruction for this group.
Nevertheless, low debt service firms are those who are not likely financially constrained
so monetary policy, operating through channels that ease financial constraints, ought
to not substantially impact this group’s flow of credit.
Unconventional Monetary Policy and Rounds of Quantitative Easing
Between November 2008 and October 2014, the Federal Reserve conducted several
rounds of quantitative easing, referred to as QE1 (Q3:2009–2010:Q1),8 QE2 (2010:Q4–
2011:Q2), operation twist (2011:Q3–2012:Q4), and QE3 (2012:Q3–2014:Q4). These
were created to lend to certain financial institutions, provide liquidity to credit mar-
kets, and purchase long-term securities. We quantify the impact of these rounds of
quantitative easing on the allocation of credit among borrowing firms. As before,
8While QE1 started in 2008:Q4, we start the counterfactual period in 2009:Q3 as in Wu and Xia
(2016) because the shadow rate does not become negative until this quarter.
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we compute wedges between actual credit creation and credit destruction and their
counterfactual values between the start and conclusion of each round of quantitative
easing.
QE1
The period known as QE1 began in November 2008 and ended in March 2010.
During this time, the Federal Reserve Board established the Term Asset-Backed Se-
curities Loan Facility (TALF). This was created to lend (non-recourse) to holders of
AAA-rated asset-backed securities that were backed by new or recent loans. Initially,
up to $180 billion was funded by the Federal Reserve and $20 billion from the Trou-
bled Asset Relief Program (TARP). This amount later increased to $1 trillion with
expanded acceptable collateral. The Federal Reserve also agreed to purchase up to
$200 billion in agency debt, $1.25 trillion in agency mortgage-backed securities, and
$300 billion in long-term Treasury securities.
Table 3.5 reports the counterfactuals for QE1 when the shadow rate is negative
(2009:Q3–2010:Q1). In the second counterfactual, actual monetary policy shocks
contributed to 0.07 and 0.10 percentage point increases in long-term credit destruction
and credit creation, respectively. While small in magnitude, long-term credit creation
and credit destruction only increased 0.43 and 0.88 percentage points during the ZLB
period, respectively. The impacts of unconventional monetary policy on short-term
credit creation and credit destruction are negligible compared to the actual changes
in these credit flows during the ZLB.
Through TALF and the purchases of agency mortgage-backed securities, policy-
makers provided funding to holders of toxic assets to ease credit markets. During
QE1, unconventional monetary policy caused relatively large increases in short-term
credit creation for low debt service and small firms compared to high debt service and
large firms. However, we find that increases in long-term credit creation due to uncon-
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ventional monetary policy were greatest for financially constrained firms. Specifically,
we find that small firms’ credit creation increased 0.22 percentage points and high
debt service firms’ credit creation increased 0.12 percentage points due to unconven-
tional monetary policy. This was the likely result of the Federal Reserve’s purchases
of long-term Treasury securities, aimed at lowering long-term yields to stimulating
long-term lending.
QE2
QE2 began in November 2010 and concluded in June 2011. This round of quan-
titative easing included monthly $75 billion purchases of Treasury securities, up to a
total of $600 billion. At the end of QE2, the Federal Reserve continued to reinvest
principal payments of their holdings. In a sense, QE2 was aimed at providing funding
to lenders in the same manner as QE1. Hence, the question that arises is whether
this policy effected the reallocation of credit among firms.
Table 3.6 provides credit flow policy counterfactuals for the QE2 period (2010:Q4–
2011:Q2). In the second counterfactual, we find that actual long-term credit destruc-
tion and credit creation increased 0.06 and 0.12 percentage points, respectively during
QE2. These magnitudes are like those during QE1. Conversely, the contributions to
aggregate short-term credit creation and credit destruction due to QE2 were negligi-
ble.
During the ZLB, unconventional monetary policy caused an increase in long-term
credit creation for high debt service firms (1.18 percentage points), but a decrease in
credit creation for low debt service firms (-0.83 percentage points). This divergence
was not yet borne during QE1, however, over the QE2 period, we find that long-term
credit creation increased 0.16 percentage points and low debt service firms’ credit
creation fell 0.03 percentage points compared to if the Federal Reserve was constrained
by the ZLB. Also, we find that there was a proportionately large monetary policy-
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induced increase in the short-term credit of small firms compared to large firms.
Operation Twist
In September 2011, the Federal Reserve announced that they would hold more
long-term Treasuries relative to short-term Treasuries, popularly referred to as op-
eration twist. This would be achieved by simultaneously purchasing $400 billion of
6-30 year Treasuries and selling $400 billion of Treasuries with maturities of 3 years
or less. In effect, this would put downward pressure on long-term yields to boost
credit markets more broadly than prior policy steps. The Federal Reserve also agreed
to purchase additional agency mortgage-backed securities from their holdings. While
the simultaneous purchase and sale of Treasuries concluded in December 2012, the
purchase of additional mortgage-backed securities continued beyond this time.
Even though these actions were intended to lower the cost of long-term credit,
we do not find that unconventional monetary policy caused a notably large increase
in long-term credit reallocation during operation twist compared to QE1 and QE2.
Unconventional monetary policy caused long-term credit creation to increase 0.15
percentage points and short-term credit creation to increase 0.12 percentage points
compared to if the Federal Reserve was constrained by the ZLB (see Table 3.7). Fur-
ther, we find minor impacts of unconventional monetary policy on credit destruction
during this time.
Operation twist made lenders’ holding of long-term Treasuries less appealing be-
cause of their smaller yield. In effect, the policy steps may have induced lenders
to seek higher returns elsewhere (Rajan, 2006). As a result, as shown in Table 3.7,
actual increases in long-term credit creation of firms due to unconventional monetary
policy increased relatively more for high debt service firms (0.22 percentage points)
and high default probability firms (0.27 percentage points). These are firms that
are more likely to be perceived as risky to lenders. We also find that short-term
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credit creation increased substantially more for financially dependent firms, but only
in the counterfactual when the monetary shock was shut down. In this counterfac-
tual, unconventional monetary policy caused a 0.64 percentage point increase in the
short-term credit of financially dependent firms; this was substantially larger than
the increase of 0.28 percentage points for non-financially dependent firms.
QE3
In September 2012, during operation twist, the Federal Reserve announced their
plans for the final round of quantitative easing (QE3). During this round, the Federal
Reserve purchased $40 billion of agency mortgage-backed securities and $45 billion
of long-term Treasuries per month. At this time, they also announce that they will
continue these purchases until conditions improve. By early 2014, the Federal Reserve
reduced purchases by $5 and $10 billion each month, eventually concluding QE3 by
October 2014.
During QE3, unconventional monetary policy caused a substantial reallocation
of long-term credit, as Table 3.8 shows. Actual long-term credit creation and credit
destruction increased 0.40 and 0.23 percentage points, respectively, due to unconven-
tional monetary policy in the second counterfactual. A similar result holds when the
monetary shock was shut down. However, in short-term credit markets during QE3,
monetary policy caused similar increases in short-term credit creation (0.17 percent-
age points) as decreases in credit destruction (-0.21 percentage points) of firms in the
second counterfactual.
During this time, unconventional monetary policy caused long-term credit creation
to increase for financially constrained firms, specifically for high debt service firms,
high default probability firms, and small firms. These increases also tended to be
larger than any other round of quantitative easing. However, notable increases in
short-term credit creation were also experienced by firms less likely to be financially
61
constrained. For instance, in the first counterfactual, monetary policy caused a 0.46
percentage point increase in short-term credit creation for low debt service firms. In
the second counterfactual, monetary policy caused relatively large increases in short-
term credit creation for low default probability and low debt service firms as well as
for small firms.
Unconventional Monetary Policy and Investment Efficiency
Up to now, we have grouped firms to analyze unconventional monetary policy’s
impact on financially constrained and non-financially constrained firms. A less studied
aspect of credit markets and unconventional monetary policy deals with how credit
is reallocated among firms of varying levels of investment efficiency. This is a topic
of interest to policymakers as credit extended to firms of high investment efficiency
ought to lead to higher economic growth.
As in Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2014), we use an investment efficiency index
by Galindo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss (2007), constructed as
Iit =
salesit
capitalit
debtit
debtst
salesit−1
capitalit−1
debtit−1
debtst−1
. (3.12)
A ratio exceeding one indicates that a firm’s investment, on average, is efficient be-
cause the debt-weighted sales as a percentage of capital is growing. Many firms tend
to have indexed close to one, so we classify firms in the top tercile as productive firms
and firms in the bottom tercile as less productive firms to analyze dissimilarities in
credit flows of such firms across time.
A priori, it is unclear if firms of high or low investment efficiency are likely to be
financially constrained. Table 3.9 describes these two groups in terms of the average
default probabilities, leverage ratios, asset size, and need for external finance. Across
time, we find that high productivity firms tend to have lower default probabilities
than low productivity firms on average. We also find that low productivity firms
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tend to have less need for external financing across time, although for both groups of
firms, because the need for external financing ratio is negative, this implies that firms
on both ends of the investment efficiency index spectrum tend to generate a relatively
large amount of cash flow. While a brief analysis of the average default probabilities
and need for external finance would suggest that low productivity firms are also
financially constrained, we also find that these firms tend to have lower leverage and
higher asset values. Therefore, it is unclear if a relationship exists between investment
efficiency and financial constraints.
We compute credit flow measures for high and low investment efficiency firms (i.e.
productive and less productive firms), shown in Table 3.10. At short and long matu-
rities, credit creation of productive firms exceeds the credit creation of less productive
firms and the credit destruction of less productive firms exceeds that of productive
firms. Credit destruction for less productive firms exceeds credit creation, leading
to negative net credit changes on average. Because credit creation is so large for
productive firms, the net credit change is substantially larger than that of all firms.
During the ZLB, both long- and short-term credit creation fell for less productive
firms, falling 0.13 and 5.56 percentage points, respectively. For productive firms,
short-term credit also fell, but less severely (-0.85 percentage points). The long-term
credit creation of productive firms increased appreciably at 3.52 percentage points.
While it is unclear how much of this was due to unconventional monetary policy, this
suggests that credit flowed to firms that are efficient in their investment, positively
impacting future economic growth.
Table 3.12 shows the policy counterfactuals during the rounds of quantitative eas-
ing from a FAVAR estimated using credit flows of productive and less productive
firms. We find that, in both counterfactuals, QE3 had the largest positive impact on
short- and long-term credit creation of productive firms. Compared to the counterfac-
tual where the Federal Reserve is constrained by the ZLB, long-term credit creation
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increased 1.28 percentage points and short-term credit creation increased 1.37 per-
centage points. The credit creation of less productive firms was minimally impacted
during the rounds of quantitative easing. However, in each round, the contribution
of unconventional monetary policy on long-term credit destruction was positive and
had a larger magnitude than that of productive firms.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we show that unconventional monetary policy has a large and
persistent impact on the allocation of credit among borrowing firms during the ZLB.
Compared to if monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB, total credit creation
increased 0.89 percentage points and credit destruction increased 0.38 percentage
points. This was driven mainly by increases in long-term credit creation and de-
struction, although unconventional monetary policy did cause substantial increases
in short-term credit creation and destruction as well. This reallocation of credit is
not accounted for when analyzing the impact of monetary policy shocks on net credit
changes alone.
By computing credit flow of financially constrained and non-financially constrained
firms, we analyze the impact of unconventional monetary policy on the allocation of
credit for these firms during the zero lower bound. The increase in short-term credit
creation was relatively large for small firms and high debt service firms, both of which
are characteristics of financially constrained firms. However, we find that the increase
due to unconventional monetary policy was relatively large for low default probability
firms. Accordingly, it is unclear whether unconventional monetary policy was effective
during the ZLB at easing financial constraints. However, in long-term credit markets,
unconventional monetary policy caused relatively large increases in credit creation for
high default probability firms, small firms, and high debt service firms. This suggest
that unconventional monetary policy was effective at easing financial constraints of
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firms in long-term credit.
Because unconventional monetary policy was conducted in rounds of quantitative
easing, we separate the contribution of monetary policy shocks to credit creation and
destruction during these periods. We find that the QE3 period had the largest positive
impact on the allocation of credit among firms, as aggregate credit creation increased
0.42 percentage points and aggregate credit destruction increased 0.20 percentage
points. We also find that long-term credit creation increased substantially more for
groups of firms classified as financially constrained during this round of quantitative
easing, implying that unconventional monetary policy was effective at easing financial
constraints of borrowing firms.
Finally, we find that during the ZLB, both short- and long-term credit creation
increased substantially more for productive firms due to unconventional monetary
policy. We measure a firm’s productivity by the change in firms’ debt weighted sales
as a percentage of capital. For long-term credit flows, the increases in long-term credit
creation due to unconventional monetary policy were largest in QE3 and operation
twist, rising 1.28 and 0.47 percentage points, respectively. The same holds in short-
term credit markets as credit creation increased 1.37 percentage points during QE3
and 0.55 percentage points during operation twist. This suggest that unconventional
monetary policy conducted during the ZLB not only resulted in the reshuffling of
credit toward financially constrained firms, but also to those better equipped to lead
to future growth and productivity through productive use of capital.
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3.6 Tables
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Financially Constrained and Non-Financially
Constrained Firms (1974:Q1–2017:Q1)
Average Coefficient of variation
POS NEG NET SUM EXC POS NEG NET SUM EXC
(a) Total credit All firms 5.4 3.5 1.9 9.0 6.9 40.6 28.0 111.1 30.1 27.3
Financially dependent firms 6.1 3.7 2.4 9.8 6.2 71.6 64.5 208.9 49.8 51.7
Non-financially dependent firms 6.8 5.2 1.7 12.0 8.2 71.9 58.3 356.1 45.9 40.0
High default probability firms 7.5 4.4 3.1 12.0 6.8 79.9 124.0 270.3 65.8 53.9
Low default probability firms 5.2 3.6 1.5 8.8 7.0 37.4 30.7 123.0 28.7 27.9
Large firms 5.1 3.2 1.9 8.2 6.1 49.1 36.3 121.1 37.8 35.6
Small firms 8.0 6.2 1.8 14.2 11.9 33.5 28.6 129.4 27.3 27.0
High debt service firms 5.5 3.0 2.5 8.6 5.9 52.2 36.7 113.5 38.8 36.7
Low debt service firms 7.4 11.7 -4.2 19.1 13.2 72.1 42.9 -143.3 44.1 58.7
(b) Short-term credit All firms 15.1 7.1 8.1 22.2 14.1 30.4 23.4 56.6 23.3 22.7
Financially dependent firms 16.3 7.3 9.0 23.6 13.1 62.3 72.6 129.3 47.6 51.8
Non-financially dependent firms 18.4 8.7 9.7 27.0 16.0 58.1 45.2 122.9 40.1 41.8
High default probability firms 15.8 7.9 8.0 23.7 13.6 58.4 73.0 133.4 47.0 56.1
Low default probability firms 15.1 7.1 8.0 22.2 14.2 34.2 25.5 64.9 25.9 24.9
Large firms 13.6 6.5 7.1 20.1 12.8 38.1 25.7 73.6 28.0 25.4
Small firms 27.3 11.4 15.8 38.7 22.9 19.9 18.6 34.6 15.9 18.6
High debt service firms 15.1 6.2 8.9 21.3 12.4 43.3 31.2 72.0 33.8 31.2
Low debt service firms 7.3 8.3 -1.0 15.6 11.6 60.8 64.7 -609.5 50.0 50.8
(c) Long-term credit All firms 5.9 3.6 2.3 9.5 7.1 41.6 32.7 94.3 33.6 32.6
Financially dependent firms 7.0 3.8 3.3 10.8 6.5 90.7 60.6 207.2 62.6 54.0
Non-financially dependent firms 7.1 5.0 2.1 12.1 8.2 79.9 69.7 334.0 53.3 44.8
High default probability firms 8.5 4.2 4.3 12.7 6.6 98.8 112.1 238.8 71.3 45.4
Low default probability firms 5.6 3.7 1.9 9.3 7.3 37.8 33.6 95.3 31.8 32.1
Large firms 5.5 3.3 2.2 8.8 6.4 48.8 40.0 105.4 40.3 41.4
Small firms 8.8 5.6 3.1 14.4 11.2 36.9 30.4 85.5 30.8 29.6
High debt service firms 6.2 3.3 2.8 9.5 6.6 50.6 40.0 100.4 40.7 40.2
Low debt service firms 20.5 9.5 11.0 29.9 18.3 55.0 58.0 98.3 46.9 54.1
Note: Following Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016), high default probability firms are those which the
default probability exceeds 25 percent at a point in time and all others are low default probability firms.
High debt service firms are those which the leverage ratio is in the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and
low debt service are those for which the leverage ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter.
Firms are large if the value of their total assets is in the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and are small if
the value of their total assets is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter. Financially dependent firms
are those which the need for external financing (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) is in the top tercile in a given
quarter and are non-financially dependent if this ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter.
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Table 3.2: Transitions Between Classifications
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High default probability 0.487 0.113
Low default probability 0.513 0.887
Large 0.849 0.019
Small 0.018 0.806
High debt service 0.637 0.115
Low debt service 0.114 0.651
Financially dependent 0.594 0.147
Non-financially dependent 0.151 0.558
Note: This table provides probabilities that a firm belongs to a certain classification in time t conditional
on the classification in t − 1. In classifying firms by terciles, the omitted probability corresponds to the
probability of being in the middle tercile conditional on being in the top or bottom tercile in the previous
quarter. Following Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016), high default probability firms are those which the
default probability exceeds 25 percent at a point in time and all others are low default probability firms.
High debt service firms are those which the leverage ratio is in the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and
low debt service are those for which the leverage ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter.
Firms are large if the value of their total assets is in the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and are small if
the value of their total assets is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter. Financially dependent firms
are those which the need for external financing (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) is in the top tercile in a given
quarter and are non-financially dependent if this ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter.
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Table 3.3: Change in Credit Flows During the Zero Lower Bound (2009:Q3–2015:Q3)
Short-term credit
POS NEG NET SUM EXC
Small firms 4.35 4.97 -0.62 9.32 8.7
Large firms 0.20 -2.17 2.37 -1.97 -4.34
Financially dependent firms -1.73 -5.12 3.39 -6.85 -10.24
Non-financially dependent firms 0.13 -1.28 1.41 -1.15 -2.56
High default probability firms 9.70 1.64 8.06 11.34 3.28
Low default probability firms 0.10 -2.29 2.39 -2.19 -4.58
High debt service firms -1.68 -0.33 -1.35 -2.01 -3.36
Low debt service firms -0.28 0.73 -1.01 0.45 -0.56
Long-term credit
POS NEG NET SUM EXC
Small firms 9.96 -1.76 11.72 8.20 -3.52
Large firms -0.15 1.00 -1.15 0.85 -0.30
Financially dependent firms 3.88 -1.56 5.44 2.32 -3.12
Non-financially dependent firms -1.65 1.00 -2.65 -0.65 -3.30
High default probability firms 4.64 -0.28 4.92 4.36 -0.56
Low default probability firms -0.36 0.93 -1.29 0.57 -0.72
High debt service firms -0.38 1.36 -1.74 0.98 -0.76
Low debt service firms 3.73 -2.98 6.71 0.75 -5.96
Note: This table provides the change in credit flow measures over the period 2009:Q3–2015:Q3. Following
Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016), high default probability firms are those which the default probability
exceeds 25 percent at a point in time and all others are low default probability firms. High debt service
firms are those which the leverage ratio is in the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and low debt service
are those for which the leverage ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter. Firms are large if
the value of their total assets is in the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and are small if the value of
their total assets is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter. Financially dependent firms are those
which the need for external financing (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) is in the top tercile in a given quarter and
are non-financially dependent if this ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter.
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Table 3.4: Policy Counterfactuals During the Zero Lower Bound (2009:Q3–2015:Q3)
(a) Counterfactual 1: no monetary shock (b) Counterfactual 2: zero lower bound
Total credit Short-term Long-term Total credit Short-term Long-term
credit credit credit credit
NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS
All firms +0.06 +0.20 +0.02 +0.19 +0.07 +0.20 +0.38 +0.89 −0.26 +0.51 +0.43 +0.88
Financially dependent firms +0.13 +0.26 +0.09 +0.68 +0.17 +0.28 +0.50 +0.75 −0.46 −0.35 +0.57 +0.77
Non-financially dependent firms +0.19 +0.34 +0.19 +0.20 +0.16 +0.38 +0.65 +0.94 −0.36 −0.50 +0.63 +0.83
High default probability firms +0.03 +0.35 −0.05 +0.02 −0.01 +0.39 +0.79 +1.26 +0.27 −0.10 +0.57 +1.30
Low default probability firms +0.10 +0.24 +0.03 +0.26 +0.12 +0.28 +0.44 +0.89 −0.29 +0.67 +0.48 +0.86
Large firms +0.08 +0.26 −0.08 +0.01 −0.08 +0.01 +0.40 +0.99 −0.34 +0.21 −0.34 +0.21
Small firms −0.08 −0.04 −0.09 +0.25 −0.05 −0.14 +0.15 +0.70 −0.10 +1.07 +0.23 +0.54
High debt service firms +0.07 +0.30 +0.04 +0.40 +0.11 +0.35 +0.37 +1.21 −0.34 +0.94 +0.46 +1.18
Low debt service firms −0.12 −0.17 −0.29 −0.14 −0.19 −0.32 +0.25 −0.42 −1.10 +0.40 +0.33 −0.83
Note: This table shows the percentage difference in how credit destruction (NEG) and credit creation (POS) would respond to monetary policy counterfactuals.
Counterfactual 1 is a scenario absent of monetary policy innovations and Counterfactual 2 is a scenario whereby monetary policy innovations are such that the
policy rate (shadow federal funds rate as in Wu and Xia (2016)) is at the zero lower bound. The table presents the wedge between the contribution of the
counterfactual monetary policy innovations and the actual innovations. A positive number suggests that the actual monetary policy contributed positively to
the credit flow measure relative to the counterfactual. Following Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016), high default probability firms are those which the default
probability exceeds 25 percent at a point in time and all others are low default probability firms. High debt service firms are those which the leverage ratio is in
the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and low debt service are those for which the leverage ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter. Firms are
large if the value of their total assets is in the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and are small if the value of their total assets is in the bottom tercile of firms
in a given quarter. Financially dependent firms are those which the need for external financing (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) is in the top tercile in a given quarter
and are non-financially dependent if this ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter.
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Table 3.5: Policy Counterfactuals During QE1 (2009:Q3–2010:Q1)
(a) Counterfactual 1: no monetary shock (b) Counterfactual 2: zero lower bound
Total credit Short-term Long-term Total credit Short-term Long-term
credit credit credit credit
NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS
All firms −0.01 −0.01 +0.01 +0.01 +0.00 −0.01 +0.06 +0.10 −0.07 −0.01 +0.07 +0.10
Financially dependent firms +0.00 +0.00 +0.02 +0.04 +0.00 +0.00 +0.04 +0.02 −0.16 −0.47 +0.04 +0.02
Non-financially dependent firms −0.01 −0.01 +0.01 +0.03 +0.00 −0.01 +0.03 +0.01 −0.19 −0.24 +0.07 −0.02
High default probability firms −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 +0.01 +0.01 −0.01 +0.18 +0.08 +0.09 −0.04 +0.15 +0.08
Low default probability firms +0.00 +0.00 +0.00 +0.01 +0.01 +0.01 +0.05 +0.08 −0.08 +0.00 +0.06 +0.07
Large firms +0.00 +0.00 +0.00 +0.00 +0.01 +0.01 +0.06 +0.10 −0.03 +0.04 +0.07 +0.09
Small firms +0.00 +0.00 −0.01 −0.03 +0.01 +0.02 +0.10 +0.21 +0.04 +0.13 +0.09 +0.22
High debt service firms +0.00 +0.01 +0.01 +0.01 +0.02 +0.03 +0.06 +0.13 −0.10 −0.03 +0.06 +0.12
Low debt service firms −0.03 −0.01 +0.00 −0.02 +0.00 −0.01 +0.16 +0.03 −0.05 +0.19 +0.21 +0.01
Note: This table shows the percentage difference in how credit destruction (NEG) and credit creation (POS) would respond to monetary policy counterfactuals.
Counterfactual 1 is a scenario absent of monetary policy innovations and Counterfactual 2 is a scenario whereby monetary policy innovations are such that the
policy rate (shadow federal funds rate as in Wu and Xia (2016)) is at the zero lower bound. The table presents the wedge between the contribution of the
counterfactual monetary policy innovations and the actual innovations. A positive number suggests that the actual monetary policy contributed positively to
the credit flow measure relative to the counterfactual. Following Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016), high default probability firms are those which the default
probability exceeds 25 percent at a point in time and all others are low default probability firms. High debt service firms are those which the leverage ratio is in
the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and low debt service are those for which the leverage ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter. Firms are
large if the value of their total assets is in the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and are small if the value of their total assets is in the bottom tercile of firms
in a given quarter. Financially dependent firms are those which the need for external financing (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) is in the top tercile in a given quarter
and are non-financially dependent if this ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter.
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Table 3.6: Policy Counterfactuals During QE2 (2010:Q4–2011:Q2)
a) Counterfactual 1: no monetary shock b) Counterfactual 2: zero lower bound
Total credit Short-term Long-term Total credit Short-term Long-term
credit credit credit credit
NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS
All firms +0.05 +0.08 -0.06 +0.01 +0.06 +0.08 +0.05 +0.11 −0.04 +0.03 +0.06 +0.12
Financially dependent firms +0.04 +0.02 −0.13 −0.46 +0.04 +0.02 +0.06 +0.08 −0.09 −0.18 +0.06 +0.09
Non-financially dependent firms +0.03 −0.01 −0.20 −0.22 +0.07 −0.04 +0.06 +0.09 −0.09 −0.13 +0.07 +0.08
High default probability firms +0.16 +0.07 +0.07 −0.03 +0.14 +0.06 +0.12 +0.14 +0.05 −0.02 +0.09 +0.15
Low default probability firms +0.05 +0.07 −0.08 +0.03 +0.06 +0.07 +0.06 +0.11 −0.05 +0.05 +0.07 +0.11
Large firms +0.05 +0.08 −0.04 +0.04 +0.06 +0.08 +0.06 +0.13 −0.03 +0.03 +0.07 +0.12
Small firms +0.08 +0.19 +0.01 +0.01 +0.08 +0.22 +0.05 +0.13 +0.01 +0.15 +0.06 +0.13
High debt service firms +0.05 +0.12 −0.09 +0.02 +0.06 +0.11 +0.06 +0.16 −0.06 +0.05 +0.07 +0.16
Low debt service firms +0.13 +0.01 −0.07 +0.15 +0.19 −0.03 +0.09 +0.00 −0.08 +0.10 +0.11 −0.03
Note: This table shows the percentage difference in how credit destruction (NEG) and credit creation (POS) would respond to monetary policy counterfactuals.
Counterfactual 1 is a scenario absent of monetary policy innovations and Counterfactual 2 is a scenario whereby monetary policy innovations are such that the
policy rate (shadow federal funds rate as in Wu and Xia (2016)) is at the zero lower bound. The table presents the wedge between the contribution of the
counterfactual monetary policy innovations and the actual innovations. A positive number suggests that the actual monetary policy contributed positively to
the credit flow measure relative to the counterfactual. Following Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016), high default probability firms are those which the default
probability exceeds 25 percent at a point in time and all others are low default probability firms. High debt service firms are those which the leverage ratio is in
the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and low debt service are those for which the leverage ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter. Firms are
large if the value of their total assets is in the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and are small if the value of their total assets is in the bottom tercile of firms
in a given quarter. Financially dependent firms are those which the need for external financing (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) is in the top tercile in a given quarter
and are non-financially dependent if this ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter.
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Table 3.7: Policy Counterfactuals During Operation Twist (2011:Q3–2012:Q4)
(a) Counterfactual 1: no monetary shock (b) Counterfactual 2: zero lower bound
Total credit Short-term Long-term Total credit Short-term Long-term
credit credit credit credit
NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS
All firms −0.02 −0.01 +0.06 +0.07 −0.04 −0.02 +0.05 +0.15 −0.01 +0.12 +0.06 +0.15
Financially dependent firms +0.03 +0.09 +0.15 +0.64 +0.04 +0.10 +0.10 +0.17 −0.01 +0.24 +0.11 +0.18
Non-financially dependent firms +0.04 +0.12 +0.25 +0.28 +0.00 +0.16 +0.13 +0.23 +0.05 +0.04 +0.11 +0.23
High default probability firms −0.13 +0.06 −0.09 +0.04 −0.13 +0.06 +0.07 +0.25 +0.00 +0.00 +0.03 +0.27
Low default probability firms +0.00 +0.02 +0.08 +0.08 −0.02 +0.03 +0.07 +0.16 −0.02 +0.15 +0.08 +0.17
Large firms -0.02 +0.01 +0.01 −0.04 −0.03 +0.00 +0.06 +0.18 −0.06 +0.02 +0.07 +0.18
Small firms −0.11 −0.19 −0.06 +0.00 −0.11 −0.27 −0.02 +0.03 −0.04 +0.21 +0.00 −0.01
High debt service firms −0.02 +0.00 +0.09 +0.14 −0.02 +0.01 +0.05 +0.21 −0.02 +0.22 +0.07 +0.22
Low debt service firms -−.16 −0.08 −0.06 −0.19 −0.25 −0.12 −0.04 −0.11 −0.21 −0.03 −0.05 −0.19
Note: This table shows the percentage difference in how credit destruction (NEG) and credit creation (POS) would respond to monetary policy counterfactuals.
Counterfactual 1 is a scenario absent of monetary policy innovations and Counterfactual 2 is a scenario whereby monetary policy innovations are such that the
policy rate (shadow federal funds rate as in Wu and Xia (2016)) is at the zero lower bound. The table presents the wedge between the contribution of the
counterfactual monetary policy innovations and the actual innovations. A positive number suggests that the actual monetary policy contributed positively to
the credit flow measure relative to the counterfactual. Following Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016), high default probability firms are those which the default
probability exceeds 25 percent at a point in time and all others are low default probability firms. High debt service firms are those which the leverage ratio is in
the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and low debt service are those for which the leverage ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter. Firms are
large if the value of their total assets is in the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and are small if the value of their total assets is in the bottom tercile of firms
in a given quarter. Financially dependent firms are those which the need for external financing (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) is in the top tercile in a given quarter
and are non-financially dependent if this ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter.
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Table 3.8: Policy Counterfactuals During QE3 (2012:Q3–2014:Q4)
(a) Counterfactual 1: no monetary shock (b) Counterfactual 2: zero lower bound
Total credit Short-term Long-term Total credit Short-term Long-term
credit credit credit credit
NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS
All firms +0.14 +0.24 −0.17 −0.01 +0.16 +0.24 +0.20 +0.42 −0.21 +0.17 +0.23 +0.40
Financially dependent firms +0.09 +0.04 −0.38 −1.16 +0.09 +0.04 +0.20 +0.23 −0.39 −0.94 +0.22 +0.23
Non-financially dependent firms +0.10 +0.04 −0.48 −0.58 +0.16 −0.07 +0.26 +0.27 −0.46 −0.55 +0.29 +0.15
High default probability firms +0.45 +0.23 +0.22 −0.09 +0.38 +0.20 +0.56 +0.51 +0.23 −0.09 +0.44 +0.48
Low default probability firms +0.13 +0.20 −0.20 +0.02 +0.14 +0.14 +0.20 +0.38 −0.23 +0.25 +0.23 +0.32
Large firms +0.15 +0.24 −0.08 +0.11 +0.16 +0.19 +0.21 +0.43 −0.17 +0.14 +0.23 +0.38
Small firms +0.23 +0.53 +0.10 +0.30 +0.21 +0.56 +0.18 +0.55 +0.01 +0.42 +0.19 +0.51
High debt service firms +0.14 +0.34 −0.24 −0.02 +0.15 +0.27 +0.19 +0.55 −0.27 +0.31 +0.22 +0.49
Low debt service firms +0.37 +0.04 −0.15 +0.46 +0.49 −0.01 +0.30 −0.14 −0.51 +0.43 +0.40 −0.33
Note: This table shows the percentage difference in how credit destruction (NEG) and credit creation (POS) would respond to monetary policy counterfactuals.
Counterfactual 1 is a scenario absent of monetary policy innovations and Counterfactual 2 is a scenario whereby monetary policy innovations are such that the
policy rate (shadow federal funds rate as in Wu and Xia (2016)) is at the zero lower bound. The table presents the wedge between the contribution of the
counterfactual monetary policy innovations and the actual innovations. A positive number suggests that the actual monetary policy contributed positively to
the credit flow measure relative to the counterfactual. Following Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016), high default probability firms are those which the default
probability exceeds 25 percent at a point in time and all others are low default probability firms. High debt service firms are those which the leverage ratio is in
the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and low debt service are those for which the leverage ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter. Firms are
large if the value of their total assets is in the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and are small if the value of their total assets is in the bottom tercile of firms
in a given quarter. Financially dependent firms are those which the need for external financing (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) is in the top tercile in a given quarter
and are non-financially dependent if this ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter.
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Table 3.9: Characteristics of Productive and Less Productive Firms
Default probability
High productivity firms Low productivity firms
1970s 1.27 1.39
1980s 2.37 3.19
1990s 3.69 5.35
2000s 5.52 7.99
2010s 4.98 6.96
Leverage
High productivity firms Low productivity firms
1970s 89.98 83.80
1980s 56.75 50.78
1990s 41.65 38.12
2000s 37.11 32.29
2010s 40.29 33.20
Asset size
Productive firms Less productive firms
1970s 156,457 178,095
1980s 341,879 416,061
1990s 673,115 855,561
2000s 2,039,329 2,375,676
2010s 4,018,495 4,994,604
Need for external financing
Productive firms Less productive firms
1970s -157.21 -165.12
1980s -288.46 -272.90
1990s -670.41 -642.25
2000s -801.73 -707.82
2010s -1104.39 -874.50
Note: This table provides the 1 percent trimmed means of default probabilities, leverage ratio (total debt
as a percentage of total assets), real assets in 2014 dollars, and the need for external financing (capital
spending less cash flow from operations as a percentage of capital spending) for high and low productivity
firms. Productive firms are those whose index of the change in debt-weighted sales as a percentage of capital
(Galindo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss, 2007) is in the top tercile of firms at a point in time and less productive
firms are those in the bottom tercile at a point in time.
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Table 3.10: Descriptive Statistics of Productive and Less Productive Firms’ Credit
Flows (1974:Q1–2017:Q1)
Average
POS NEG NET SUM EXC
Productive firms Total credit 13.3 2.1 11.2 15.4 4.2
Short-term credit 27.2 5.5 21.7 32.7 10.9
Long-term credit 13.7 2.6 11.0 16.3 5.2
Less productive firms Total credit 1.9 7.1 -5.3 9.0 3.7
Short-term credit 10.6 12.3 -1.8 22.9 19.0
Long-term credit 2.6 6.2 -3.6 8.7 5.0
Coefficient of variation
POS NEG NET SUM EXC
Productive firms Total credit 42.6 43.5 49.2 38.7 43.5
Short-term credit 36.3 32.2 45.6 31.0 32.2
Long-term credit 46.0 43.2 54.6 41.3 43.2
Less productive firms Total credit 43.0 34.4 -46.6 29.9 43.0
Short-term credit 44.8 31.0 -307.6 29.1 30.7
Long-term credit 46.7 42.0 -75.1 34.4 41.6
Note: Productive firms are those whose index of the change in debt-weighted sales as a percentage of capital
(Galindo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss, 2007) is in the top tercile of firms and less productive firms are those in
the bottom tercile.
Table 3.11: Change in Productive and Less Productive Firms’ Credit Flows during
the Zero Lower Bound (2009:Q3–2015:Q3)
POS NEG NET SUM EXC
Productive firms Total credit 2.79 -0.26 3.05 2.53 -0.53
Short-term credit -0.85 -0.35 -0.49 -1.20 -0.70
Long-term credit 3.52 -0.23 3.75 3.29 -0.46
Less productive firms Total credit -0.06 -0.76 0.70 -0.83 -0.13
Short-term credit -5.56 -0.88 -4.68 -6.44 -11.12
Long-term credit -0.13 -0.02 -0.11 -0.16 -0.27
Note: Productive firms are those whose index of the change in debt-weighted sales as a percentage of capital
(Galindo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss, 2007) is in the top tercile of firms and less productive firms are those in
the bottom tercile.
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Table 3.12: Policy Counterfactuals During the Zero Lower Bound for Productive and Less Productive Firms (2009:Q3–2015:Q3)
(a) Counterfactual 1: no monetary shock (b) Counterfactual 2: zero lower bound
Total credit Short-term Long-term Total credit Short-term Long-term
credit credit credit credit
NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS
QE1 Productive firms +0.00 −0.02 +0.00 −0.04 +0.00 +0.02 +0.05 +0.32 −0.03 +0.20 +0.05 +0.34
Less productive firms −0.01 +0.00 +0.00 +0.00 +0.00 −0.01 +0.07 +0.01 −0.10 +0.00 +0.08 −0.02
QE2 Productive firms +0.04 +0.24 −0.03 +0.18 +0.04 +0.29 +0.04 +0.36 −0.02 +0.28 +0.04 +0.38
Less productive firms +0.06 +0.01 −0.11 +0.02 +0.07 −0.02 +0.10 +0.02 −0.06 −0.02 +0.11 +0.01
Operation twist Productive firms −0.01 −0.01 +0.01 +0.11 −0.02 −0.05 +0.04 +0.45 −0.02 +0.55 +0.05 +0.47
Less productive firms +0.04 +0.02 +0.12 −0.04 +0.01 +0.04 +0.15 +0.04 +0.00 −0.05 +0.15 +0.04
QE3 Productive firms +0.11 +0.79 −0.07 +0.58 +0.11 +0.81 +0.16 +1.27 −0.12 +1.37 +0.16 +1.28
Less productive firms +0.17 +0.03 −0.24 +0.00 +0.18 −0.06 +0.32 +0.07 −0.25 −0.04 +0.34 −0.03
Note: This table shows the percentage difference in how credit destruction (NEG) and credit creation (POS) would respond to monetary policy counterfactuals.
Counterfactual 1 is a scenario absent of monetary policy innovations and Counterfactual 2 is a scenario whereby monetary policy innovations are such that the
policy rate (shadow federal funds rate as in Wu and Xia (2016)) is at the zero lower bound. The table presents the wedge between the contribution of the
counterfactual monetary policy innovations and the actual innovations. A positive number suggests that the actual monetary policy contributed positively to the
credit flow measure relative to the counterfactual. Productive firms are those whose index of the change in debt-weighted sales as a percentage of capital (Galindo,
Schiantarelli, and Weiss, 2007) is in the top tercile of firms at a point in time and less productive firms are those in the bottom tercile at a point in time.
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3.7 Figures
Figure 3.1: Impulse Responses to an Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock
Note: These graphs plot quarterly impulse responses to a -25 basis point monetary policy shock using the
sample, 1974:Q1–2017:Q1, in a FAVAR(4) setting. The x-axis is number of quarters following the monetary
easing shock. The policy rate, aggregate credit destruction, and aggregate credit creation are percentage
points and all remaining are percentage deviations from the steady state.
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Figure 3.2: Policy Counterfactuals During the Zero Lower Bound
Note: The solid lines are the observed economic variables between 2009:Q3 and 2015:Q3. The dashed lines
are the values if the monetary shocks were shut down and the dotted lines are the values of these variables
if the shadow policy rate were at the zero lower bound.
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Chapter 4 Trade Flows and Credit Shocks in Global Supply Chains
4.1 Introduction
Following the global financial crisis of the late 2000s, there was a severe collapse
in trade flows worldwide. In the U.S., real exports of goods and services contracted
nearly 12 percent on a year-over-year basis in 2009 alone, while real GDP declined only
3.4 percent. During this time, other economies experienced declines in real exports of
goods and services up to 30 percent. In the U.S. and other developed economies, trade
collapses were concentrated in manufacturing goods, while trade flows of services were
virtually unscathed (Baldwin, 2009; Ariu, 2016). A fundamental difference between
exporters of manufacturing goods and exporters of services is that the former tends
to be more dependent upon and vulnerable to credit markets. These markets were
severely strained in the late 2000s and there is evidence of large differential effects
of adverse credit market conditions during this financial crisis (Chor and Manova,
2012).1
Previous research highlights that trade between upstream exporters and down-
stream importers is jointly sensitive to credit conditions in origin and destination
countries in a global supply chain. For instance, Chor and Manova (2012) show
that exporting countries’ cost of credit and upstream sectors’ vulnerability to ad-
verse credit conditions are key factors explaining the global trade collapse of the late
2000s. Further, Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017) find that adverse credit con-
ditions in downstream sectors cause sizable declines in upstream exports (Niepmann
1Amiti and Weinstein (2011); Greenaway, Guariglia, and Kneller (2007); Blanchard, Das, and
Faruqee (2010); Görg and Spaliara (2018); among others.
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and Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2017).2 Therefore, in this chapter, I estimate the effects of
upstream and downstream credit conditions on international trade and the differen-
tial impacts during times of financial crisis. Previous literature establishes the link
between credit conditions and international trade during the global financial crisis.
However, links during less severe or wide-spread financial crises in exporting and im-
porting countries in a global supply chain is largely unexplored. In this chapter, I
also aid in explaining the magnitude of international trade declines in crisis periods
such as in Japan and Nordic countries in the 1990s, in addition to the crises of the
late 2000s.3
Exporters are exposed to adverse credit conditions for several reasons. First, ex-
porting firms bear substantial default risk in international transactions and rely on
credit default insurance provided by financial institutions. As financial conditions
deteriorate, this insurance becomes uncharacteristically scarce or costly, making ex-
porting less profitable. Second, exporting requires large production and transporta-
tion costs. Thus, exporting firms depend on ample working capital to compensate for
lags between transaction and payment (Amiti and Weinstein, 2011). While exporting
firms tend to be large and highly productive relative to domestic producers, firms
often are not capable of raising financial capital internally, and therefore rely on do-
mestic and international credit markets. Third, exporting firms require upfront fixed
costs to learn about distribution and regulatory environments abroad and to learn
of the potential profitability of entering into trade. As credit conditions weaken and
external financing becomes costly, exporting profitability decreases. Finally, adverse
financial and economic conditions impact the demand for imports, either as inputs to
further production or for final use.
2Others have addressed the topic of trade between one country and many partners (e.g. Behrens,
Corcos, and Mion (2013) and Bricongne, Fontagné, Gaulier, Taglioni, and Vicard (2012)).
3See Romer and Romer (2017) for a thorough discussion of these and other lesser-known crises
that span this time period.
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As in Chor and Manova (2012), I measure a sector’s financial vulnerability by
their need for external financing, trade credit dependence, and value of collateral.
Consistent with previous literature, I find that the need for external financing is
negatively associated with trade flows when credit costs are high, and that the effect is
amplified during financial crises.4,5 However, I find that the magnitude is larger when
the financially vulnerable sector is upstream, especially in developed economies. Next,
I find that international trade is negatively impacted when the downstream sector is
dependent on trade credit and the importer’s cost of credit is high. Conversely, when
the upstream sector is similarly dependent on trade credit and the exporter’s cost
of credit is low, then international trade flows are positively impacted. Finally, I
find mixed results on whether the value of collateral is a relevant factor to explain
international trade.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the data and methodol-
ogy. Section 4.3 describes the empirical procedure and estimation results, and Section
4.4 concludes.
4.2 Data Description and Descriptive Statistics
To estimate the effects of upstream and downstream credit conditions on trade
flows and differential effects during times of financial crisis, I combine data from sev-
eral sources. Trade flow data comes from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD)
and sectoral financial vulnerability measures are constructed using Compustat North
America data. Country-specific financial crisis indicators come from independent
classifications of specific crises from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), Laeven and Valen-
4I use bilateral trade data between upstream and downstream sectors for 40 countries using the
World Input-Output Database (WIOD).
5Related studies, such as Zavacka and Iacovone (2009), highlight that exporters’ reliance on
external finance negatively contributes to export volumes in normal times and in crisis. Görg and
Spaliara (2018) show that exporters, specifically those reliant on external financing, tended to exit
the market during the global financial crisis.
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cia (2012), and Romer and Romer (2017). Finally, data on countries’ costs of credit
come from various sources. The resulting panel contains data on for 40 countries, 14
upstream sectors, and 34 downstream sectors over the period 1995-2011.
World Input-Output Database
Detailed information on countries’ supply and use of goods and services is needed
to analyze the impact of credit conditions in an increasingly complex supply chain.
WIOD contains bilateral flows of the use of inputs and production of goods and
services at the upstream and downstream sector level from 1995 to 2011. In the 2013
release,6 27 EU countries and 13 other countries, such as Australia, Canada, China,
and USA, who collectively constitute the majority of world GDP, are included. Using
ISIC Rev. 3 from the United Nations, firms are grouped into 35 sectors, offering
ample coverage of goods and services produced in an economy.7
Analysis of WIOD highlights the severity of the coordinated trade collapse of the
late 2000s. The average growth rate of aggregate trade between 1996 and 2008 was a
robust 6.7 percent.8 In 2009, 36 of the 40 countries experienced aggregate declines in
upstream export production. Lithuania and Russia experienced 29.3 and 24.8 percent
declines, respectively, while the growth rate exceeded 9 percent for China and Indone-
sia. For downstream consumption, the hardest hit country was Lithuania, falling 30.8
percent. India (3.2 percent), China (9.4 percent), and Indonesia (10.1 percent) were
the only countries that experienced growth in downstream consumption in 2009. Fig-
ure 4.1 plots the imports of goods and services and exports of manufacturing goods
around financial crises as classified by Laeven and Valencia (2012). The first panel
6As of this writing, the 2016 release is available for the period 2000-2014, although the release
excludes the period of severe financial crisis in Asian countries in the 1990s.
7See the Appendix for the WIOD–ISIC Rev. 3 concordance.
8Aggregate trade is the sum of aggregate upstream production and is equal to aggregate down-
stream consumption.
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shows that small counties’ exports were more severely impacted after financial crisis
compared to large countries. Conversely, imports of small countries did not fall as
severely as large countries after a crisis. The second panel shows that for all coun-
tries, trade flows collapse in the period after the beginning of the crisis, on average.
It is not until three years after the start of the crisis that these flows reach pre-crisis
levels. Further, the decline in flows for the U.S., while severe, rebounded quicker and
reached pre-crisis levels quicker than average over the period.
The U.S. financial crisis coincided with a global financial crisis and a worldwide
trade flow collapse. The Asian crisis of the late 1990s was also a period of severe
financial crisis that impacted trade flow, although this was a more geographically
concentrated financial crisis. The second panel of Figure 4.1 plots average trade flows
for countries in financial crisis in the late 2008 and Asian countries’ trade around
financial crisis in the late 1990s. This figure shows that the increase in trade increased
more rapidly prior to the financial crises, the decline in trade was larger, and the
recovery was slower. While Asian countries reached pre-crisis levels three quarters
after the start of the crises, on average, trade for countries impacted by the global
financial crisis still have not reached pre-crisis levels.
Sectoral Financial Vulnerability
I measure a sector’s financial vulnerability using firm-level income statement and
balance sheet information from Compustat North America. Following Chor and
Manova (2012), financial vulnerability is measured as the need for external financing,
dependence of trade credit, and the value of collateral. I measure financial vulnera-
bility as the time-invariant median for all firms in a sector over the period 1996-2005.
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These are constructed as follows:
Need for external financingk = Median
{
capital expendituresjkt−cash flow from operationsjkt
capital expendituresjkt
}
(4.1)
Trade creditk = Median
{
∆(accounts payablejkt)
∆(total assetsjkt)
}
(4.2)
where the change is over a 10-year period.
V alue of collateralk = Median
{
net value of property, plant, and equipmentjkt
total assetsjkt
}
(4.3)
where firms,j, in sectors, k, are mainly U.S. firms across time, t. These measure global
conditions by the assumption that firms in in the sample are generally large and likely
have access to advanced financial systems. Therefore, the financial vulnerability of
sectors in the U.S. ought to measure optimal strategies of sectors abroad. Further,
the ordering of financial vulnerability among sectors is the main information needed
to identify effects on trade flows.
While I restrict the upstream sectors to manufacturing because these goods are
typically tradable, I include all downstream sectors.9 These additional sectors produce
both tradable and non-tradable goods and services. I group firms into 34 sectors using
the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), and by the United
Nations Statistics Division concordance,10 multiple sectors from ISIC Rev. 3 are
subsets of certain NAICS codes.11
9The one exception is ‘private households with employed persons’ because financial data does
not exist for this sector.
10http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regso.asp?Ci=28&Lg=1.
11See the Appendix for a mapping of the sectors in WIOD and NAICS
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The need for external financing measures the degree to which capital expendi-
tures are financed with sources other than internal cash flow. As Figure 4.2 shows,
sectors with the largest need for external financing over this period are ‘renting of
machinery and equipment and other business activities,’ ‘coke, refined petroleum,
and nuclear fuel,’ and ‘chemicals and chemical product.’ Among those with minimal
external financing reliance are ‘financial intermediation,’ ‘textiles and textile product’
manufacturing, and ‘wholesale trade and commission trade.’
Trade credit, while not typically used to finance long-term investment (Rajan and
Zingales, 1995), is an alternative source of funding. As Figure 4.3 shows, sectors
among the most reliant on trade credit are ‘wholesale and commission trade,’ ‘motor
vehicles, motorcycles, and fuel sales,’ and ‘retail trade and repair of household goods.’
Agriculture and manufacturing sectors are virtually equally reliant on trade credit.
The value of collateral measures firms’ credit worthiness and ability to pledge col-
lateral for external financing. Among sectors with lowest values, and therefore most
exposed to adverse credit conditions through this channel, are ‘financial intermedia-
tion and real estate’ as shown in Figure 4.4. Sectors with the highest overall value of
collateral and therefore most able to pledge collateral are ‘water transport,’ ‘hotels
and restaurants,’ and ‘inland transportation.’
Credit Conditions
To measure the cost of credit within a country, I use the three-month interbank
rate from OECD Main Economic Indicators.12 Of the 40 countries in the sample,
interbank rates are available for the entire period for 22 countries. Bulgaria and
Cyprus, whom are included in WIOD, do not have available data and Brazilian in-
terbank rates are only available over the period 1997-2003. Interbank rates for the
12http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MEI_FIN. When this data is unavailable, I
supplement with Bloomberg data.
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remaining countries are available starting between 1996 and 2005, through 2011. See
Table 4.1 for a complete list of country interbank rate availability.
Over time and on average, interest rates have fallen considerably in response to
the global financial crisis, as Table 4.2 shows, although the timing of expansionary
policies differed. Japan experienced low interest rates throughout the period, while
countries such as Turkey, Romania, and Hungary experienced substantially higher
rates. Towards the end of the period, even these countries’ rates have fallen consider-
ably. To further illustrate, Figure 4.5 plots the average interest rate per period with
selected countries’ interest rates.
According to Chor and Manova (2012), an ideal measure of credit conditions
incorporates actual costs of trade financing because interbank rates may not coincide
precisely with the actual cost of doing business. While Compustat contains firm-
level data on the break out of short- and long-term debt, firm-level information on
individual costs of credit is not available. I utilize interbank rates as an imperfect
measure because the actual cost of external financing ought to mirror this rate.
Financial Crisis Indicators
Chor and Manova (2012) use a financial crisis dummy variable that takes a value
of 1 from September 2008 through August 2009. Because this study spans a longer
period and analyzes trade between several countries, a broader financial crisis measure
is needed. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and Laeven and Valencia (2012) create annual
country-specific banking crisis indicators through 2010 and 2011, respectively. The
former measure covers 30 of the 40 WIOD countries, and the latter covers 35 WIOD
countries. Romer and Romer (2017) use real-time analysis to classify episodes of
financial crisis in countries semiannually through 2012 and provide narrative for each
episode. Their measure covers 24 countries, all of which are OECD countries, of which
20 of the 40 WIOD countries are included in their classification. For robustness, each
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of these measures will be utilized separately.
4.3 The Role of Upstream and Downstream Financial Conditions on
Trade Flows
I estimate the effects of upstream and downstream credit conditions on trade
flows in normal times, and the differential effects in times of financial crisis using a
triple difference specification. The treatment is whether an importer or exporter is
in financial crisis, and the intensity of treatment is a sector’s financial vulnerability.
In identifying the effects of credit conditions on trade flows in normal times, I exploit
variation in importer and exporter credit costs over time, variation between credit
costs at a point in time, and variation in financial vulnerability across sectors. I also
exploit variation in financial crises over time and across countries in identifying the
differential effect of credit conditions in financial crisis.
Empirical Procedure
To estimate the effects of credit conditions on trade flows across countries and
sectors, I utilize the following triple difference specification:
log(exports)eiudt = β1(V ulnu × IBet) + β2(V ulnd × IBit)+
β3(V ulnu × IBet × Financial crisiset) + β4(V ulnd × IBit × Financial crisisit)
+ αet + γit + δud + eiudt (4.4)
for exporting country e, importing country i, upstream sector u, and downstream
sector d, where t indicates time. V ulnu and V ulnd are the upstream and downstream
measures of financial vulnerability, respectively. IBet and IBit are interbank rates for
the exporting country and importing country, respectively, and Financial crisiset and
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Financial crisisit are country measure of financial crisis for exporting and importing
countries, respectively.
I include an exporting country-time fixed effect (αet) that captures fluctuations,
over time, in production conditions in the exporting country and the impact of ex-
change rate fluctuations on aggregate production. An importing country-time fixed
effects (γit) captures aggregate country and time specific shocks, such as import de-
mand for products in the importing country. An upstream-downstream sector fixed
effect (δud) accounts for time invariant dependencies that exist between sectors. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the exporting country and importing country levels to
account for correlation of error terms across country clusters. While errors may also
be correlated across countries within sectors, for multi-way clustering, I cluster at the
highest level of aggregation.
Core Results
Need for External Financing
The estimation results of (4.4), utilizing the need for external financing as the
financial vulnerability indicator, are shown in the second columns of Tables 4.3, 4.4
and 4.5. The estimates of β1 and β2 in each table differ solely by country sample
and period, based on availability of financial crisis indicators from their sources,
as described in Section 4.2. β1 ranges from -0.025 to -0.017, indicating that when
interbank rates increase one standard deviation in an exporting country, exports
from the country’s upstream sector whose need for external financing is one standard
deviation above the mean, fall 1.7 to 2.5 percent. In comparison, when downstream
sectors have similar needs for external financing and the importing country’s interbank
rate rises similarly (as measured by β2), exports to the country-sector fall between
0.7 and 1.1 percent.
While β2 is smaller in magnitude than β1, the impact of downstream credit con-
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ditions on trade flows in normal times, as expressed by β2, is non-trivial. When the
importer’s cost of credit is high, downstream sectors that are highly dependent on
external financing may have difficulty raising funds or these funds are overly costly.
The ensuing lack of cash flow in these downstream sectors leads to falling production
in the importing country, and, therefore, falling demand for imports for the upstream
product.
How does the magnitude of these effects change during times of financial crisis,
both domestically and abroad? A negative estimate for β3 or β4 will provide evidence
that these effects of credit conditions on trade flows are amplified during financial
crisis in the exporting or importing country, respectively. From Tables 4.3, 4.4 and
4.5, while β3 and β4 are negative, they are not statistically different from zero when
utilizing the financial crisis indicators by Laeven and Valencia (2012) and Reinhart
and Rogoff (2011). Instead, utilizing the sample of countries and financial crisis
indicator by Romer and Romer (2017), I find that the sign of β3 and β4 is negative
and statistically significant. This evidence is similar to Chor and Manova (2012), who
find a negative and statistically significant coefficient of the triple interaction measure
when the importing country is the U.S.13
The joint impact of exporter credit conditions and the upstream sector’s need
for external financing is larger in times of crisis than for the importer-downstream
counterpart using the financial crisis indicator and sample of countris from Romer and
Romer (2017). During times of exporter financial crisis, when the upstream sector’s
need for external financing is one standard deviation above the mean, a one standard
deviation increase in exporter interbank rates leads to a decline in upstream exports
of 5.8 percent.14 When the same conditions are met for the downstream sector-
13The coefficients from Chor and Manova (2012) are not directly comparable to the results pre-
sented in Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 because I standardize the financial vulnerability measures and
interbank rates.
14This is (β1 + β3)× 100
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importing country, the sector’s exports fall an additional 1.9 percent. This effect is
magnified if the importing and exporting countries are both in financial crisis. When
upstream and downstream sectors are jointly highly dependent on external financing
(e.g. one standard deviation above the mean), and when interbank rates rise one
standard deviation in each country, the impact on trade between these sectors is -7.6
percent. This is similar in magnitude to actual declines in trade flows in 2009.
Value of Collateral
Beyond the need for external financing, trade between sectors may be sensitive
to the value of importing and exporting firms’ physical assets. These assets can be
pledged as collateral to finance production of goods, therefore sectors with ample
physical assets are less vulnerable to adverse credit market conditions (Claessens and
Laeven, 2003). Even when a firm has adequate collateralizable assets, they may be
exposed to adverse credit conditions through declining asset values of their trading
counterpart. For instance, upstream production is dependent on downstream demand
for a good. If a downstream firm either does not have access to credit or only has
access to costly credit because of their lack of collateral, they will be forced to lower
production (i.e. a contagion effect).
To test the importance of this characteristic, I re-estimate (4.4) using the value
of collateral for the upstream and downstream sectors as the measure of financial
vulnerability. Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 show that β2, the joint impact of the upstream
sector’s collateral values and exporter interbank rates, is positive and statistically
significant across the samples. β1 is significant only for the countries included in
the Romer and Romer (2017) sample, although the sign is negative. The sign and
significance of β2 indicates that when the importing country’s interbank rate rises one
standard deviation and the downstream sector’s value of collateral is one standard
deviation below the mean, exports to this sector fall 1.2 or 1.3 percent, depending
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on the financial crisis indicator and sample country used in estimation. In times of
importer or exporter financial crisis, there is little support to suggest that this effect
is amplified. Only in the sample and crisis indicator from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)
is β3 of the expected sign and statistically significant.
Trade Credit Dependence
There are conflicting explanations regarding the impact of trade credit on eco-
nomic activity (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Considerable trade credit usage may
result from exhaustion of traditional credit, indicating that these sectors are more
exposed to adverse credit conditions. Alternatively, trade credit is a substitute for
traditional credit, and firms that are highly dependent on trade credit are less ex-
posed to adverse credit markets. The former explanation implies that the sign of β1
and β2 are negative, while the latter implies positive coefficients.
Because trade credit dependence can either contribute positively or negatively to
trade flows (i.e. the sign of the coefficients in (4.4) with trade credit dependence is
unclear), this topic can be addressed empirically. Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 show that
β1 is positive for all samples, and that β1 is positive and statistically significant using
the country sample from Romer and Romer (2017). β2 is consistently negative and
statistically significant along all samples. These results suggest that importers are
more likely than exporters to utilize trade credit because they have exhausted tradi-
tional financing. Therefore, trade falls from an upstream exporter to a downstream
importer when interbank rates are high in the importing country and both sectors
are dependent on trade credit. Using the Romer and Romer (2017) country sample,
exporters are more likely to be isolated from their country’s adverse credit markets,
as a positive value of β1 implies.
Chor and Manova (2012) find a positive coefficient for the impact of trade credit
interacted with financial vulnerability during times of crisis. This implies that when
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interbank rates are high in the exporting country and the upstream sector is heavily
reliant on trade credit, exports to the U.S. fall during the global financial crisis. For
this specification, β3 and β4 are not statistically significant, and I do not find support
for an amplifying or attenuating effect during financial crisis.
Developed and Developing Countries
I test for the presence of asymmetries in the impact of credit conditions on in-
ternational trade, which may depend upon the size of the importing and exporting
country. I rank economies by real GDP per capita in 2011 and classify firms as “de-
veloped” if they fall in the top half of countries and “developing” otherwise. Next, I
re-estimate (4.4) where trade flows between importers and exporters are restricted to
(i.) developed to developed economies, (ii.) developed to developing economies, (iii.)
developing to developed economies, and (iv.) developing to developing economies
separately. Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 provides results using the sample of countries and
financial crisis indicators by Romer and Romer (2017), Reinhart and Rogoff (2011),
and Laeven and Valencia (2012), respectively.
In re-estimating (4.4) using the need for external financing as the financial vul-
nerability measure, I find that the impact of credit conditions on international trade
during non-crisis periods is only significant if the importing or exporting country are
both developed. Among developed exporting countries, the magnitude of credit con-
ditions on international trade is larger when they export to developing economies.
The effects of downstream credit conditions for developed economies are only statis-
tically significant when the importing country is a developed economy, although the
magnitude is larger if the exporter is a developed economy.
The size and significance of the effect of credit conditions during financial crisis
depends on which financial crisis indicator and sample of countries is used in the
estimation of (4.4). For upstream exporters in developed economies, the effect of
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upstream credit conditions during times of financial crisis is -2.2 percent if the down-
stream importer is a developed economy, but -4.1 percent if the country is developing
using the Romer and Romer (2017) financial crisis indicator and sample of countries.
By instead estimating (4.4) using the Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) crisis indicator and
country sample, the differential effect of importer credit conditions during times of
financial crisis is -2.8 percent if both the upstream exporter and downstream im-
porter are from developed economies. The effect of importer credit conditions during
times of financial crisis is negative and statistically significant when the upstream
exporter is a developing economy using the Romer and Romer (2017) and Reinhart
and Rogoff (2011) financial is measures and country samples. Using the Laeven and
Valencia (2012) financial crisis measures and country sample, if the exporting country
is in financial crisis, trade falls an additional 5.0 and 5.5 percent when the upstream
exporter is a developed and undeveloped economy, respectively.
Using the value of collateral as the measure of financial vulnerability, the effect
of importer credit conditions on international trade out of financial crisis is consis-
tently positive and statistically significant when the importing country is developed.
However, the effect of upstream credit conditions on trade is large and statistically
significant between developing economies. When interbank rates rise one standard
deviation and the downstream sector of a developed importer has a value of collateral
that is one standard deviation above the mean, trade falls between 0.9 and 1.0 per-
cent, regardless of whether the upstream exporter is of a developed or undeveloped
economy. However, the magnitude of upstream credit conditions is 11.8 percent using
the Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) country sample and crisis indicator and 4.3 percent
using the Laeven and Valencia (2012) crisis measures and sample when both countries
are developing.
For importing sectors in developing economies, there is an amplifying effect of
credit conditions whether the upstream exporter is from a developed or developing
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economy. This effect ranges from 1.1 to 2.3 percent depending on the sample of
countries and financial crisis indicator used in estimation of (4.4). However, there
is a sign reversal for the effect of credit conditions during financial crisis when the
importer or exporter is developing. Recall that the financial vulnerability measures
come from firm-level balance sheet and income statement data of North American
firms. Therefore, in general, sectors with ample collateralizable assets are identified
effectively for the U.S., however these may not identify sectors correctly for developing
economies. This can account for the sign reversals; however, I am not able to remedy
this due to the lack of reliable firm-level data for foreign firms.
For the specification with trade credit dependence as the financial vulnerability
measure, I find that the effect of credit conditions on trade flows in normal times de-
pends on whether the sector is upstream or downstream. Worsening upstream credit
conditions lead to decreases in trade flows but increases for downstream importers.
A typical result, as seen in Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8, is that the effect of credit condi-
tions during times of importer or exporter financial crisis tends to be negative when
statistically significant. For upstream exporters, the differential effect during times
of exporter financial crisis is only present for developed economies.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter documents that adverse upstream and downstream credit conditions
negatively affect global trade flows. For downstream sectors, when a country’s cost of
credit rises and a downstream sector is financially vulnerable to adverse credit mar-
kets (measured by the sector’s need for external financing, trade credit dependence,
or value of collateral), then this negatively impacts trade flows to these sectors. For
upstream sectors, the impact of adverse domestic credit conditions is significant when
utilizing a sector’s need for external financing to measure sectoral financial vulner-
ability. In addition, the magnitude of the impact of adverse credit conditions (as
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measured by the need for external financing) on trade flows is larger for upstream
sectors. That is, when the interbank rate rises one standard deviation in the im-
porting country, imports to a downstream sector fall between 0.7 and 1.1 percent.
Conversely, when the interbank rate rises one standard deviation in the exporting
country, exports from an upstream sector fall between 1.7 and 2.5 percent.
I find an amplifying effect of credit conditions on international trade for sectors
whose need for external financing is high, using the financial crisis measure and sample
of countries from Romer and Romer (2017). During times of financial crisis in the
importing country, imports fall an additional 1.1 percent when the interbank rate in
the importing country and the downstream sector’s need for external financing is one
standard deviation above the mean. During financial crisis in the exporting country,
exports fall an additional 3.3 percent when the upstream sector’s need for external
financing and the exporting country’s interbank rates is one standard deviation above
the mean.
By splitting the sample by GDP per capita, I find asymmetries in effects of credit
conditions on international trade flows and differential effects during times of financial
crisis. For developed importers and exporters, there is a negative impact of upstream
credit conditions, as measured by the interaction between the sector’s need for exter-
nal financing and the exporting country’s interbank rate on trade flows, regardless of
whether the trading partner is from a developed or undeveloped economy. By esti-
mating the impact of credit conditions on trade flows using the value of collateral to
measure of a sector’s financial vulnerability, I find that adverse credit conditions of
downstream importers lead to declines in exports to the sector if the importer is from
a developed economy. Further, adverse upstream credit conditions lead to substantial
declines in trade flows between developing economies. For trade credit utilization to
measure financial vulnerability, I find that the differential effect of credit conditions
in times of financial crisis is only present for developed upstream exporters.
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4.5 Tables
Table 4.1: Availability of Country Interbank Rates
1995-2011: AUS, AUT, BEL, CAN, CZE, DEU, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GBR,
HUN, IRL, ITA, JPN, KOR, NLD, POL, PRT, SWE, TUR, USA
1996-2011: EST, SVK
1997-2011: MEX, RUS
1998-2011: CHN, IDN, LVA, ROU
1999-2011: LUX
2001-2011: GRC
2002-2011: IND, LTU
2004-2011: MLT
2005-2011: TWN
1997-2003: BRA
Unavailable: BGR, CYP
Source: OECD, Bloomberg.
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Interbank Rates
Average Std. dev Min Max
1995 12.84 18.36 0.55 (JPN) 88.28 (TUR)
1996 11.32 19.53 0.62 (JPN) 99.22 (TUR)
1997 13.07 19.35 0.63 (JPN) 100.76 (TUR)
1998 14.95 19.35 0.77 (JPN) 89.82 (TUR)
1999 12.19 18.53 0.28 (JPN) 79.80 (ROU)
2000 9.06 9.96 0.30 (JPN) 50.74 (ROU)
2001 9.25 13.12 0.16 (JPN) 69.96 (TUR)
2002 7.35 9.14 0.09 (JPN) 49.40 (TUR)
2003 5.64 6.75 0.09 (JPN) 33.75 (TUR)
2004 4.42 4.62 0.09 (JPN) 21.95 (TUR)
2005 3.74 2.91 0.09 (JPN) 14.84 (TUR)
2006 4.56 3.23 0.31 (JPN) 17.47 (TUR)
2007 5.19 2.52 0.73 (JPN) 16.71 (TUR)
2008 5.73 2.99 0.85 (JPN) 17.39 (TUR)
2009 3.32 3.60 0.40 (SWE) 13.05 (RUS)
2010 2.15 2.26 0.31 (USA) 7.40 (TUR)
2011 2.56 2.23 0.30 (USA) 8.55 (TUR)
Source: OECD, Bloomberg.
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Table 4.3: Impact of Financial Vulnerability, Credit Conditions, and Financial Crises
on Trade Flows Using Laeven and Valencia (2012) Measures
Need for external financing Value of collateral Trade credit dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exports exports exports exports exports exports
V ulnu × IBet -0.023∗∗∗ -0.017∗ 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.012
V ulnd × IBit -0.010∗∗ -0.007∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.013∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.009∗∗
V ulnu × IBet × Financial crisiset -0.032 0.024 -0.019
V ulnd × IBit × Financial crisisit -0.019 -0.001 0.001
Observations 7893757 7893757 7893757 7893757 7893757 7893757
R-squared 0.645 0.645 0.645 0.645 0.645 0.645
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table reports the impact of financial vulnerability and financial crises on trade flows over 1995–
2011. Data spans 35 countries from the World Input Output Database, 14 downstream sectors, and 34
downstream sectors from Compustat North America. The financial crisis indicator takes a value of 1 if the
country is in a systemic banking crisis according to Laeven and Valencia (2012), and zero otherwise. The
dependent variable is the log of trade flows from the exporting country to the importing country, standardized
to a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. The first set of specifications utilizes the need for external
financing as the measure of financial vulnerability, followed by a set for the value of collateral and trade
credit dependence as in Chor and Manova (2012), standardized to a mean of zero and standard deviation of
one. The measure of financial vulnerability and the standardized interbank are omitted due to collinearity.
Standard errors are clustered at the exporting country and importing country level.
Table 4.4: Impact of Financial Vulnerability, Credit Conditions, and Financial Crises
on Trade Flows Using Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) Measures
Need for external financing Value of collateral Trade credit dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exports exports exports exports exports exports
V ulnu × IBet -0.025∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ 0.018 0.010 0.007 0.012
V ulnd × IBit -0.014∗∗ -0.011∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.012∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.010∗∗
V ulnu × IBet × Financial crisiset -0.012 0.042∗ -0.025
V ulnd × IBit × Financial crisisit -0.012 0.002 0.006
Observations 5358618 5358618 5358618 5358618 5358618 5358618
R-squared 0.639 0.639 0.639 0.639 0.639 0.639
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table reports the impact of financial vulnerability and financial crises on trade flows over 1995–
2011. Data spans 35 countries from the World Input Output Database, 14 downstream sectors, and 34
downstream sectors from Compustat North America. The financial crisis indicator takes a value of 1 if the
country is in a banking crisis according to Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), and zero otherwise. The dependent
variable is the log of trade flows from the exporting country to the importing country, standardized to a
mean of zero and standard deviation of one. The first set of specifications utilizes the need for external
financing as the measure of financial vulnerability, followed by a set for the value of collateral and trade
credit dependence as in Chor and Manova (2012), standardized to a mean of zero and standard deviation of
one. The measure of financial vulnerability and the standardized interbank are omitted due to collinearity.
Standard errors are clustered at the exporting country and importing country level.
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Table 4.5: Impact of Financial Vulnerability, Credit Conditions, and Financial Crises
on Trade Flows Using Romer and Romer (2017) Measures
Need for external financing Value of collateral Trade credit dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exports exports exports exports exports exports
V ulnu × IBet -0.031∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.010∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
V ulnd × IBit -0.010∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
V ulnu × IBet × Financial crisiset -0.033∗∗ 0.027 -0.021
V ulnd × IBit × Financial crisisit -0.011∗ -0.007 -0.006
Observations 2863711 2863711 2863711 2863711 2863711 2863711
R-squared 0.706 0.706 0.705 0.706 0.706 0.706
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table reports the impact of financial vulnerability and financial crises on trade flows over 1995–
2011. Data spans 35 countries from the World Input Output Database, 14 downstream sectors, and 34
downstream sectors from Compustat North America. The financial crisis indicator takes a value of 1 if
the country is in a credit disruption, minor crisis, moderate crisis, or major crisis according to Romer and
Romer (2017), and zero otherwise. The dependent variable is the log of trade flows from the exporting
country to the importing country, standardized to a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. The
first set of specifications utilizes the need for external financing as the measure of financial vulnerability,
followed by a set for the value of collateral and trade credit dependence as in Chor and Manova (2012),
standardized to a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. The measure of financial vulnerability and
the standardized interbank are omitted due to collinearity. Standard errors are clustered at the exporting
country and importing country level.
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Table 4.6: Impact of Financial Vulnerability, Credit Conditions, and Financial Crises
on Trade Flows Among Developing and Developed Countries Using Laeven and Va-
lencia (2012) Measures
(a) Developed countries to developed countries
Need for external financing Value of collateral Trade credit dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exports exports exports exports exports exports
V ulnu × IBet -0.024∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ 0.009 0.004 -0.005 -0.001
V ulnd × IBit -0.013∗∗ -0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.009∗∗ -0.004 -0.003
V ulnu × IBet × Financial crisiset -0.023 0.029 -0.028
V ulnd × IBit × Financial crisisit -0.011 0.010 -0.003
Observations 2565804 2565804 2565804 2565804 2565804 2565804
R-squared 0.632 0.632 0.632 0.632 0.632 0.632
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(b) Developed countries to developing countries
Need for external financing Value of collateral Trade credit dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exports exports exports exports exports exports
V ulnu × IBet -0.027∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗ 0.005 0.002 -0.000 0.002
V ulnd × IBit -0.010 -0.005 0.009 0.014 -0.017∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
V ulnu × IBet × Financial crisiset -0.024 0.018 -0.013
V ulnd × IBit × Financial crisisit -0.050∗∗ -0.051 0.015
Observations 1977435 1977435 1977435 1977435 1977435 1977435
R-squared 0.692 0.692 0.691 0.692 0.691 0.691
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(c) Developing countries to developed countries
Need for external financing Value of collateral Trade credit dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exports exports exports exports exports exports
V ulnu × IBet -0.022 -0.013 0.025 0.022 0.028∗ 0.031∗∗
V ulnd × IBit -0.011∗ -0.009∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.009∗ -0.004 -0.004
V ulnu × IBet × Financial crisiset -0.077 0.027 -0.024
V ulnd × IBit × Financial crisisit -0.013 0.011∗∗ -0.002
Observations 1982147 1982147 1982147 1982147 1982147 1982147
R-squared 0.688 0.688 0.688 0.688 0.688 0.688
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(d) Developing countries to developing countries
Need for external financing Value of collateral Trade credit dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exports exports exports exports exports exports
V ulnu × IBet -0.013 -0.004 0.052∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.039∗∗
V ulnd × IBit -0.008 -0.003 0.008 0.014 -0.018∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
V ulnu × IBet × Financial crisiset -0.071 0.078 0.029
V ulnd × IBit × Financial crisisit -0.055∗∗ -0.062 0.018
Observations 1368371 1368371 1368371 1368371 1368371 1368371
R-squared 0.592 0.592 0.592 0.592 0.592 0.592
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table reports the impact of financial vulnerability and financial crises on trade flows over 1995–
2011. Data spans 35 countries from the World Input Output Database, 14 downstream sectors, and 34
downstream sectors from Compustat North America. The top half of countries by GDP per capita in 2011
are considered developed while the bottom half are considered developing. The financial crisis indicator
takes a value of 1 if the country is in a systemic banking crisis according to Laeven and Valencia (2012), and
zero otherwise. The dependent variable is the log of trade flows from the exporting country to the importing
country, standardized to a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. The first set of specifications utilizes
the need for external financing as the measure of financial vulnerability, followed by a set for the value
of collateral and trade credit dependence as in Chor and Manova (2012), standardized to a mean of zero
and standard deviation of one. The measure of financial vulnerability and the standardized interbank are
omitted due to collinearity. Standard errors are clustered at the exporting country and importing country
level.
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Table 4.7: Impact of Financial Vulnerability, Credit Conditions, and Financial Crises
on Trade Flows Among Developing and Developed Countries Using Reinhart and
Rogoff (2011) Measures
(a) Developed countries to developed countries
Need for external financing Value of collateral Trade credit dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exports exports exports exports exports exports
V ulnu × IBet -0.025∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ 0.010 0.004 -0.005 0.003
V ulnd × IBit -0.013∗∗ -0.010∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.009∗∗ -0.004 -0.006
V ulnu × IBet × Financial crisiset -0.011 0.062 -0.081∗∗∗
V ulnd × IBit × Financial crisisit -0.028∗ 0.020∗ 0.016
Observations 2406860 2406860 2406860 2406860 2406860 2406860
R-squared 0.633 0.633 0.632 0.633 0.632 0.633
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(b) Developed countries to developing countries
Need for external financing Value of collateral Trade credit dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exports exports exports exports exports exports
V ulnu × IBet -0.027∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ 0.006 -0.001 -0.000 0.007
V ulnd × IBit -0.018∗∗ -0.021 0.011 0.017 -0.017∗∗ -0.025∗∗
V ulnu × IBet × Financial crisiset -0.014 0.068 -0.068∗∗
V ulnd × IBit × Financial crisisit 0.005 -0.011 0.015∗
Observations 1213503 1213503 1213503 1213503 1213503 1213503
R-squared 0.668 0.668 0.667 0.668 0.668 0.668
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(c) Developing countries to developed countries
Need for external financing Value of collateral Trade credit dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exports exports exports exports exports exports
V ulnu × IBet -0.022 -0.003 0.048∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗ 0.033 0.048
V ulnd × IBit -0.010 -0.007∗ 0.011∗ 0.009∗∗ -0.006 -0.008∗
V ulnu × IBet × Financial crisiset -0.031 -0.035 -0.025
V ulnd × IBit × Financial crisisit -0.028∗ 0.023∗ 0.013
Observations 1215023 1215023 1215023 1215023 1215023 1215023
R-squared 0.678 0.678 0.679 0.679 0.678 0.679
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(d) Developing countries to developing countries
Need for external financing Value of collateral Trade credit dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exports exports exports exports exports exports
V ulnu × IBet -0.021 0.001 0.082∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.072∗
V ulnd × IBit -0.017∗ -0.019 0.006 0.011 -0.016∗∗ -0.023∗∗
V ulnu × IBet × Financial crisiset -0.038 -0.061∗∗ -0.031
V ulnd × IBit × Financial crisisit 0.003 -0.008 0.012
Observations 523232 523232 523232 523232 523232 523232
R-squared 0.618 0.618 0.620 0.620 0.619 0.619
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table reports the impact of financial vulnerability and financial crises on trade flows over 1995–
2011. Data spans 35 countries from the World Input Output Database, 14 downstream sectors, and 34
downstream sectors from Compustat North America. The top half of countries by GDP per capita in 2011
are considered developed while the bottom half are considered developing. The financial crisis indicator
takes a value of 1 if the country is in a banking crisis according to Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), and zero
otherwise. The dependent variable is the log of trade flows from the exporting country to the importing
country, standardized to a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. The first set of specifications utilizes
the need for external financing as the measure of financial vulnerability, followed by a set for the value
of collateral and trade credit dependence as in Chor and Manova (2012), standardized to a mean of zero
and standard deviation of one. The measure of financial vulnerability and the standardized interbank are
omitted due to collinearity. Standard errors are clustered at the exporting country and importing country
level.
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Table 4.8: Impact of Financial Vulnerability, Credit Conditions, and Financial Crises
on Trade Flows Among Developing and Developed Countries Using Romer and Romer
(2017) Measures
(a) Developed countries to developed countries
Need for external financing Value of collateral Trade credit dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exports exports exports exports exports exports
V ulnu × IBet -0.026∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.004 0.020∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
V ulnd × IBit -0.011∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.005∗
V ulnu × IBet × Financial crisiset -0.022∗∗ 0.023 -0.019
V ulnd × IBit × Financial crisisit -0.007 0.000 -0.012∗
Observations 1061803 1061803 1061803 1061803 1061803 1061803
R-squared 0.702 0.702 0.701 0.702 0.702 0.702
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(b) Developed countries to developing countries
Need for external financing Value of collateral Trade credit dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exports exports exports exports exports exports
V ulnu × IBet -0.037∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.008 0.022∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
V ulnd × IBit -0.063∗ -0.026 -0.017 0.042 0.025 -0.009
V ulnu × IBet × Financial crisiset -0.041∗∗∗ 0.018 -0.015
V ulnd × IBit × Financial crisisit -0.052 -0.081∗∗ 0.046
Observations 711272 711272 711272 711272 711272 711272
R-squared 0.736 0.736 0.735 0.735 0.735 0.735
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(c) Developing countries to developed countries
Need for external financing Value of collateral Trade credit dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exports exports exports exports exports exports
V ulnu × IBet -0.097 -0.071 0.009 -0.068 -0.104 -0.097
V ulnd × IBit -0.009∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗ -0.005∗
V ulnu × IBet × Financial crisiset -0.036 0.105 -0.010
V ulnd × IBit × Financial crisisit -0.009∗ -0.002 -0.011∗
Observations 708762 708762 708762 708762 708762 708762
R-squared 0.686 0.686 0.686 0.686 0.686 0.686
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(d) Developing countries to developing countries
Need for external financing Value of collateral Trade credit dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exports exports exports exports exports exports
V ulnu × IBet -0.179 -0.143 0.027 -0.064 0.027 0.030
V ulnd × IBit -0.039 -0.006 -0.067 -0.005 0.028 0.001
V ulnu × IBet × Financial crisiset -0.047 0.116 -0.004
V ulnd × IBit × Financial crisisit -0.042 -0.079∗∗ 0.034
Observations 381874 381874 381874 381874 381874 381874
R-squared 0.675 0.675 0.674 0.675 0.674 0.674
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table reports the impact of financial vulnerability and financial crisis on trade flows over 1995–
2011. Data spans 35 countries from the World Input Output Database, 14 downstream sectors, and 34
downstream sectors from Compustat North America. The top half of countries by GDP per capita in 2011
are considered developed while the bottom half are considered developing. The financial crisis indicator takes
a value of 1 if the country is in a credit disruption, minor crisis, moderate crisis, or major crisis according
to Romer and Romer (2017), and zero otherwise. The dependent variable is the log of trade flows from the
exporting country to the importing country, standardized to a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
The first set of specifications utilizes the need for external financing as the measure of financial vulnerability,
followed by a set for the value of collateral and trade credit dependence as in Chor and Manova (2012),
standardized to a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. The measure of financial vulnerability and
the standardized interbank are omitted due to collinearity. Standard errors are clustered at the exporting
country and importing country level.
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4.6 Figures
Figure 4.1: Trade Flows Around Financial Crises
Source: WIOD; Laeven and Valencia (2012).
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Figure 4.2: Need for External Financing
Note: A sector’s need for external financing is the median value of the ratio of capital expenditures less cash
flow from operations to capital expenditures over the period 1996–2005.
Figure 4.3: Reliance on Trade Credit
Note: A sector’s reliance on trade credit is the median value between 1996 and 2005 of the ratio of the
change in accounts payable over this period and the change in total assets over this period.
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Figure 4.4: Value of Collateral
Note: A sector’s value of collateral is the median ratio of net value of property, plant, and equipment to
total assets over the period 1996–2005.
Figure 4.5: Select Interbank Rates
Source: OECD, Bloomberg.
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Appendix A
A.1 Chapter 1 Appendix
Alternative Credit Flow Measure
Credit flow measures are calculated using quarterly growth rates of debt from
Compustat North America. This follows Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2011), who
measure credit flow measures using annual growth rates over a longer horizon. The
following table presents averages and coefficients of variation by decade using year-
over-year growth rates. These more closely resemble credit flow measures constructed
with annual data.
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics of Quarterly Credit Flow Measures
Average Coefficient of variation
NEG POS NET SUM EXC NEG POS NET SUM EXC
1974:Q1–1979:Q4 5.55 10.83 5.27 16.38 10.85 25.50 52.71 116.87 34.08 22.86
1980:Q1–1989:Q4 7.01 19.77 12.76 26.77 13.80 23.67 54.82 84.69 41.52 21.56
1990:Q1–1999:Q4 7.50 15.16 7.65 22.66 14.89 33.06 38.35 69.38 31.72 32.87
2000:Q1–2009:Q4 8.41 17.55 9.14 25.96 16.70 24.90 32.80 72.49 21.51 23.87
2010:Q1–2017:Q1 6.55 13.34 6.79 19.90 13.07 23.45 14.42 40.69 10.65 22.96
Note: This table reports averages and coefficients of variation for of credit measures for all publicly traded
firms. POS refers to credit credit creation, NEG is credit destruction, NET is net credit change (NETst =
POSst − NEGst), SUM is credit reallocation (SUMst = POSst + NEGst), and EXC is excess credit
reallocation (EXCst = SUMst − |NETst|).
Alternative Monetary Policy Rates
In the empirical analysis of the effect of monetary policy on credit flows, I utilize
the effective federal funds rate in normal times and the Wu-Xia shadow rate during
the ZLB. Alternative measures of monetary policy during the ZLB are by Krippner
(2012) and Bauer and Rudebusch (2016). The following plots these rates along with
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the effective federal funds rate and the impulse responses derived from a VAR utilizing
these alternative measures as the monetary policy rate.
Figure A.1: Alternative Monetary Policy Rates
Source: Federal Reserve Board; Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta; Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco;
Reserve Bank of New Zealand. The shaded bar indicates an NBER recession.
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Figure A.2: Impulse Responses to an Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock Using the
Policy Rate From Krippner (2012)
Note: These graphs plot quarterly impulse responses to a -100 basis point monetary policy shock. The
impulse responses are derived from a VAR that includes a block of macroeconomic variables, the shadow
short rate (Krippner, 2012), and two credit flow measures. It includes a constant and two lags, chosen by
BIC. The bands represent the 68 percent mean-bias-corrected residual-based wild bootstrap interval.
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Figure A.3: Impulse Responses to an Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock Using the
YZ(3)-25 Policy Rate By Bauer and Rudebusch (2016)
Note: These graphs plot quarterly impulse responses to a -100 basis point monetary policy shock. The
impulse responses are derived from a VAR that includes a block of macroeconomic variables, the YZ(3)-25
policy rate (Bauer and Rudebusch, 2016), and two credit flow measures. It includes a constant and two
lags, chosen by BIC. The bands represent the 68 percent mean-bias-corrected residual-based wild bootstrap
interval.
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Figure A.4: Impulse Responses to an Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock Using the
MZ(2)-25 policy Rate by Bauer and Rudebusch (2016)
Note: These graphs plot quarterly impulse responses to a -100 basis point monetary policy shock. The
impulse responses are derived from a VAR that includes a block of macroeconomic variables, the MZ(2)-25
policy rate (Bauer and Rudebusch, 2016), and two credit flow measures. It includes a constant and two
lags, chosen by BIC. The bands represent the 68 percent mean-bias-corrected residual-based wild bootstrap
interval.
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Identification Through External Instruments
Following Gertler and Karadi (2015), consider a VAR using monthly data with
the following order
Yt =

log(consumer pricest)
log(industrial productiont)
Excess bond premiumt
1-year Treasury ratet
 =

CPIt
IPt
EBPt
GS1t
 (A.1)
and the SVAR is represented by
A0Yt =
12∑
j=1
AjYt−j + Et. (A.2)
The reduced-form VAR is
Yt =
12∑
j=1
BjYt−j + ut. (A.3)
Full identification can be achieved by assuming A−10 is lower triangular. From A0,
the structural innovations can be backed out through the identify that
EˆCholt = Aˆ0ut (A.4)
where the structural innovation of interest corresponds to the policy variable, the
one-year Treasury rate, EˆCholGS1,t.
Timing restrictions are problematic because monetary policy is likely to influence
and respond to the system’s economic and financial variables. Following Gertler
and Karadi (2015), surprises in federal funds futures on FOMC dates (Zt) with the
following characteristics
E[ZtE ′GS1,t] 6= 0 (A.5)
110
E[ZtE ′−GS1,t] = 0 (A.6)
are used as external instruments. The structural innovation, EGS1,t, and the reduced-
form innovations (ηt) can be represented such that
ηGS1,t = φEBPηEBP,t + φIPηIP,t + φCPIηCPI,t + EGS1,t (A.7)
where each reduced-form innovation is a function of all structural innovations. From
the assumptions in (A.5) and (A.6), the instrument is only correlated with the struc-
tural innovation for the policy indicator, although they may be correlated with the
reduced-form innovations. In the first step, estimate the following
ηGS1,t = piZt + et (A.8)
and obtain the fitted value ηˆGS1,t. Regress each reduced-form residual other than for
GS1 on the fitted value
ηEBP,t = δEBP ηˆGS1,t + vEBP,t (A.9)
ηIP,t = δIP ηˆGS1,t + vIP,t (A.10)
ηCPI,t = δCPI ηˆCPI,t + vCPI,t (A.11)
Next, regress the reduced-form residual for GS1 on v−GS1,t and obtain unbiased
estimates of φ−GS1
ηGS1,t = φEBPvEBP + φIPvIP + φCPIvCPI + et (A.12)
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and
EˆIVt = ηGS1,t − φˆEBPηEBP,t − φˆIPηIP,t − φˆCPIηCPI,t (A.13)
By expanding Yt to include credit destruction and creation,1 the following shows
the response to an unanticipated 100 basis point decrease in the monetary policy rate.
The first graph shows the responses of total credit flows for all firms where mone-
tary policy shocks are identified through Cholesky. The second shows the impulse
responses when shocks are identified through external instruments.
Figure A.5: Impulse Responses with Cholesky and External Instruments
Note: These graphs plot quarterly impulse responses to a -100 basis point monetary policy shock. The
impulse responses are derived from a VAR that includes consumer prices, industrial production, excess bond
premium, and 1-year Treasury rate. Monetary policy shocks are identified using Cholesky. The bands
represent the 68 percent interval using the residual-based wild bootstrap method.
1The data is transformed from monthly to quarterly because credit flow is calculated using
quarterly Compustat data.
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A.2 Chapter 2 Appendix
Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics of Quarterly Credit Flow Measures
Average Coefficient of variation
NEG POS NET SUM EXC NEG POS NET SUM EXC
1974:Q1–1979:Q4 5.55 10.83 5.27 16.38 10.85 25.50 52.71 116.87 34.08 22.86
1980:Q1–1989:Q4 7.01 19.77 12.76 26.77 13.80 23.67 54.82 84.69 41.52 21.56
1990:Q1–1999:Q4 7.50 15.16 7.65 22.66 14.89 33.06 38.35 69.38 31.72 32.87
2000:Q1–2009:Q4 8.41 17.55 9.14 25.96 16.70 24.90 32.80 72.49 21.51 23.87
2010:Q1–2017:Q1 6.55 13.34 6.79 19.90 13.07 23.45 14.42 40.69 10.65 22.96
Note: This table reports averages and coefficients of variation for of credit measures for all publicly traded
firms. POS refers to credit credit creation, NEG is credit destruction, NET is net credit change (NETst =
POSst − NEGst), SUM is credit reallocation (SUMst = POSst + NEGst), and EXC is excess credit
reallocation (EXCst = SUMst − |NETst|).
Table A.3: Common Observations Between Groups (1973:Q1–2017:Q1)
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High default probability 15.4%
High debt service 0.6% 31.5%
Financially dependent 3.7% 9.1% 25.0%
Small 5.4% 8.5% 9.3% 31.7%
Productive 1.2% 10.3% 6.8% 7.1% 24.6%
Less productive 1.9% 7.8% 6.3% 7.3% 0.0% 24.6%
Note: Following Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016), high default probability firms are those which the
default probability exceeds 25 percent at a point in time and all others are low default probability firms.
High debt service firms are those which the leverage ratio is in the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and
low debt service are those for which the leverage ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter.
Firms are large if the value of their total assets is in the top tercile of firms in a given quarter and are small if
the value of their total assets is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter. Financially dependent firms
are those which the need for external financing (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) is in the top tercile in a given
quarter and are non-financially dependent if this ratio is in the bottom tercile of firms in a given quarter.
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Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics with Static and Dynamic Thresholds (1973:Q1–
2017:Q1)
Average Coefficient of variation
POS NEG NET SUM EXC POS NEG NET SUM EXC
(a) Total credit High default probability firms 7.5 4.4 3.1 12.0 6.8 79.9 124.0 270.3 65.8 53.9
High default probability firms (top tercile) 6.4 4.1 2.4 10.5 7.5 50.1 42.1 154.3 34.3 31.1
Low default probability firms 5.2 3.6 1.5 8.8 7.0 37.4 30.7 123.0 28.7 27.9
Low default probability firms (bottom tercile) 4.2 3.5 0.7 7.7 6.1 46.0 41.0 298.3 33.9 31.9
(b) Short-term credit High default probability firms 15.8 7.9 8.0 23.7 13.6 58.4 73.0 133.4 47.0 56.1
High default probability firms (top tercile) 15.1 7.2 7.9 22.3 14.1 45.2 31.1 89.1 32.8 29.9
Low default probability firms 15.1 7.1 8.0 22.2 14.2 34.2 25.5 64.9 25.9 24.9
Low default probability firms (bottom tercile) 16.0 7.6 8.3 23.6 15.3 32.5 33.3 60.1 27.4 33.1
(c) Long-term credit High default probability firms 8.5 4.2 4.3 12.7 6.6 98.8 112.1 238.8 71.3 45.4
High default probability firms (top tercile) 7.1 4.2 2.9 11.3 7.8 55.8 44.3 152.8 38.5 33.4
Low default probability firms 5.6 3.7 1.9 9.3 7.3 37.8 33.6 95.3 31.8 32.1
Low default probability firms (bottom tercile) 4.6 3.5 1.1 8.1 6.4 47.9 45.0 209.4 37.5 33.9
Note: Firms are subset first by their default probability following Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016)
whereby firms whose default probability exceeds 25 percent at a point in time are considered high default
probability firms and all others are low default probability firms.
Table A.5: Group Transitions for Static and Dynamic Thresholds
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High default probability 0.487 0.113
Low default probability 0.513 0.887
High default probability (top tercile) 0.558 0.169
Low default probability (bottom tercile) 0.225 0.648
Note: This table provides probabilities that a firm belongs to a certain classification in time t conditional
on the classification in t − 1. For firms classified as high or low default probability firms based on terciles,
the omitted probability corresponds to the probability of being in the middle tercile conditional on being
classified as a high or low default probability firm in the previous quarter.
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Table A.6: Policy Counterfactuals Using a Dynamic Default Probability Threshold
a) Counterfactual 1: no monetary shock b) Counterfactual 2: zero lower bound
Total credit Short-term Long-term Total credit Short-term Long-term
credit credit credit credit
NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG POS
Zero lower bound (2009:Q3–2015:Q3)
High default probability firms (top tercile) +0.06 +0.23 +0.03 +0.09 +0.04 +0.24 +0.48 +0.79 −0.03 +0.11 +0.47 +0.75
Low default probability firms (bottom tercile) +0.13 +0.19 +0.08 +0.39 +0.14 +0.21 +0.46 +0.74 −0.11 +0.85 +0.48 +0.69
QE1 (2009:Q3–2010:Q1)
High default probability firms (top tercile) +0.00 −0.01 +0.00 +0.01 +0.01 −0.01 +0.08 +0.04 −0.02 −0.03 +0.09 +0.03
Low default probability firms (bottom tercile) +0.00 +0.00 +0.01 +0.00 +0.01 +0.01 +0.04 +0.08 −0.07 −0.05 +0.05 +0.06
QE2 (2010:Q4–2011:Q2)
High default probability firms (top tercile) +0.06 +0.03 −0.02 +0.00 +0.08 +0.02 +0.07 +0.09 −0.01 −0.01 +0.07 +0.09
Low default probability firms (bottom tercile) +0.04 +0.07 −0.06 −0.05 +0.04 +0.06 +0.06 +0.09 −0.03 +0.05 +0.07 +0.09
Operation twist (2011:Q3–2012:Q4)
High default probability firms (top tercile) −0.04 +0.06 +0.03 +0.05 −0.06 +0.06 +0.06 +0.17 +0.01 +0.04 +0.05 +0.17
Low default probability firms (bottom tercile) +0.01 +0.01 +0.09 +0.18 +0.00 +0.01 +0.08 +0.13 +0.02 +0.24 +0.09 +0.13
QE3 (2012:Q3–2014:Q4)
High default probability firms (top tercile) +0.20 +0.11 −0.05 −0.06 +0.23 +0.06 +0.28 +0.28 −0.05 +0.02 +0.30 +0.22
Low default probability firms (bottom tercile) +0.09 +0.18 −0.18 −0.13 +0.10 +0.13 +0.19 +0.33 −0.17 +0.17 +0.20 +0.27
Note: This table shows the percentage difference in how credit destruction (NEG) and credit creation (POS) would respond to monetary policy counterfactuals.
Counterfactual 1 is a scenario absent of monetary policy innovations and Counterfactual 2 is a scenario whereby monetary policy innovations are such that the
policy rate (shadow federal funds rate as in Wu and Xia (2016)) is at the zero lower bound. The table presents the wedge between the contribution of the
counterfactual monetary policy innovations and the actual innovations. A positive number suggests that the actual monetary policy contributed positively to the
credit flow measure relative to the counterfactual. Firms are subset first by their default probability following Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016) whereby firms
whose default probability exceeds 25 percent at a point in time are considered high default probability firms and all others are low default probability firms as
well as separating them into top and bottom terciles.
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Figure A.6: Estimated Factors
Note: The principal components are extracted using 99 quarterly macroeconomic series over the period
Q1:1974–Q1:2017. The factors are obtained by removing the impact of the monetary policy rate on the
principal components.
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Figure A.7: Impulse Responses of Credit Market Indicators to a Monetary Easing
Shock
Note: These graphs plot quarterly impulse responses to a -25 basis point monetary policy shock using the
sample, 1974:Q1–2017:Q1, in a FAVAR(4) setting. The x-axis is number of quarters following the monetary
easing shock. C&I loans outstanding and consumer credit outstanding are percentage deviations from the
steady state and all remaining variables are percentage points.
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Figure A.8: Policy Counterfactuals During the Zero Lower Bound for Credit Market
Indicators
Note: The solid lines are the observed economic variables between 2009:Q3 and 2015:Q3. The dashed lines
are the values if the monetary shocks were shut down and the dotted lines are the values of these variables
if the shadow policy rate were at the zero lower bound.
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A.3 Chapter 3 Appendix
Table A.7: WIOD–ISIC Rev. 3 Concordance
Industry Sub-industry WIOD ISIC rev. 3
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing Agriculture, hunting and related c1 01
Forestry, logging and related service activities c1 02
Fishing, fish hatcheries and farms c1 05
Mining and Quarrying Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat c2 10
Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas c2 11
Mining of uranium and thorium ores c2 12
Mining of metal ores c2 13
Other mining and quarrying c2 14
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco food products and beverages c3 15
tobacco products c3 16
Textiles and Textile Products textiles c4 17
wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur c4 18
Leather, Leather and Footwear leather; luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear c5 19
Wood and Products of Wood and Cork wood, wood and cork products, straw, plaiting materials c6 20
Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing paper and paper products c7 21
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media c7 22
Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel c8 23
Chemicals and Chemical Products chemicals and chemical products c9 24
Rubber and Plastics rubber and plastics products c10 25
Other Non-Metallic Mineral other non-metallic mineral products c11 26
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal basic metals c12 27
fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment c12 28
Machinery, Nec machinery and equipment n.e.c. c13 29
Electrical and Optical Equipment office, accounting and computing machinery c14 30
electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. c14 31
radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus c14 32
medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks c14 33
Transport Equipment motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers c15 34
other transport equipment c15 35
Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. c16 36
Recycling c16 37
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply c17 40
Collection, purification and distribution of water c17 41
Construction Construction c18 45
Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel Sale, Maintenance and Repair; Retail Sale of Fuel c19 50
Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade c20 51
Retail Trade; Repair of Household Goods Retail Trade; Repair of Household Goods c21 52
Hotels and restaurants Hotels and restaurants c22 55
Inland transport Land transport; transport via pipelines c23 60
Water transport Water transport c24 61
Air transport Air transport c25 62
transport activities; travel agencies transport activities; travel agencies c26 63
Post and telecommunications Post and telecommunications c27 64
Financial intermediation Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding c28 65
Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security c28 66
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation c28 67
Real estate activities Real estate activities c29 70
Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities Renting of machinery and equipment c30 71
Computer and related activities c30 72
Research and development c30 73
Other business activities c30 74
Public administration and defense; compulsory social security Public administration and defence; compulsory social security c31 75
Education Education c32 80
Health and social work Health and social work c33 85
Other community, social and personal service activities Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities c34 90
Activities of membership organizations n.e.c. c34 91
Recreational, cultural and sporting activities c34 92
Other service activities c34 93
Private households with employed persons Private households with employed persons c35 95
Note: The first column is the industry classification fromWIOD and the second column are the corresponding
sub-industries by ISIC rev. 3.
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Table A.8: WIOD–NAICS Concordance
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 c15 c16 c17 c18 c19 c20 c21 c22 c23 c24 c25 c26 c27 c28 c29 c30 c31 c32 c33 c34 c35
111 X X X
112 X X
113 X X X
114 X X
115 X X X X
211 X
212 X
213 X X X
221 X X X
236 X
237 X X
238 X X X X X X X
311 X X X X
312 X X X X
313 X X
314 X X X X
315 X X
316 X X X
321 X X X X
322 X X X X X X
323 X X X X
324 X X X X
325 X X X X X X X X
326 X X X X X
327 X X
331 X X X X X
332 X X X X X X X X
333 X X X X X
334 X X X X X
335 X X X X X
336 X X X X X X X
337 X X X X X X X
339 X X X X X X X X X X X X
423 X X X
424 X X
425 X X
441 X X X
442 X
443 X
444 X
445 X
446 X
447 X X
448 X
451 X
452 X X
453 X X
454 X
481 X
482 X
483 X
484 X
485 X
486 X
487 X X X X
488 X X X X X X X X X
491 X
492 X
493 X
511 X X
512 X X X
515 X X
516 X
517 X
518 X X
519 X X X
521 X
522 X
523 X X
524 X
531 X
532 X X
533 X
541 X X X X X X X
551 X X
120
WIOD–NAICS Concordance cont.
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 c15 c16 c17 c18 c19 c20 c21 c22 c23 c24 c25 c26 c27 c28 c29 c30 c31 c32 c33 c34 c35
561 X X X X X X X X X X X
562 X X X
611 X X X X
621 X
622 X
623 X
624 X X
711 X X X
712 X
713 X X
721 X
722 X X
811 X X X X X X X X X X X
812 X X X X X
813 X X
814 X
921 X
922 X
923 X
924 X
925 X
926 X
927 X
928 X
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting
111: crop production; 112: animal production; 113: forestry and logging; 114: fishing, hunting, and trapping; 115: support activities for agriculture and forestry
Mining
211: oil and gas extraction; 212: mining (except oil and gas); 213: support activities for mining
Utilities (221)
Construction
236: construction of buildings; 237: heavy and civil engineering construction; 238: specialty trade contractors
Manufacturing
311: food manufacturing; 312: beverage and tobacco product manufacturing; 313: textile mills; 314: textile product mills; 315: apparel manufacturing; 316: leather and allied product manufacturing; 321: wood product manufacturing; 322: paper manufacturing; 323: printing and related support activities; 324: petroleum and coal products
manufacturing; 325: chemical manufacturing; 326: plastics and rubber products manufacturing; 327: nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing; 331: primary metal manufacturing; 332: fabricated metal product manufacturing; 333: machinery manufacturing; 334: computer and electronic product manufacturing; 335: electrical equipment,
appliance, and component; manufacturing; 336: transportation equipment manufacturing; 337: furniture and related product manufacturing; 339: misc. manu.
Wholesale trade
423: merchant wholesalers, durable goods; 424: merchant wholesalers, nondurable goods; 425: wholesale electronic markets and agents and brokers
Retail trade
441: motor vehicle and parts dealers; 442: furniture and home furnishings stores; 443: electronics and appliance stores; 444: building material and garden equipment and supplies dealers; 445: food and beverage stores; 446: health and personal care stores; 447: gasoline stations; 448: clothing and clothing accessories stores; 451: sporting
goods, hobby, book, and music stores; 452: general merchandise stores; 453: misc. store retailers; 454: nonstore retailers
Transportation and warehousing
481: air transportation; 482: rail transportation; 483: water transportation; 484: truck transportation; 485: transit and ground passenger transportation; 486: pipeline transportation; 487: scenic and sightseeing transportation; 488: support activities for transportation; 491: postal service; 492: couriers and messengers; 493: warehousing
and storage
Information
511: publishing industries (except internet); 512: motion picture and sound recording industries; 515: broadcasting (except internet); 516: internet publishing and broadcasting; 517: telecommunications; 518: internet service providers, web search portals, and data processing services; 519: other information services
Finance and insurance
521: monetary authorities - central bank; 522: credit intermediation and related activities; 523: securities, commodity contracts, and other financial investments and related activities; 524: insurance carriers and related activities
Real estate and rental and leasing
531: real estate; 532: rental and leasing services; 533: lessors of nonfinancial intangible assets (except copyrighted works)
Professional, scientific, and technical services (541)
Management of companies and enterprises (551)
Administrative support and waste management and remediation services
561: administrative and support services; 562: waste management and remediation services
Educational services (611)
Health care and social assistance
621: ambulatory health care services; 622: hospitals; 623: nursing and residential care facilities; 624: social assistance
Arts, entertainment, and recreation
711: performing arts, spectator sports, and related industries; 712: museums, historical sites, and similar institutions; 713: amusement, gambling, and recreation industries
Accommodation and food services
721: accommodation; 722: food services and drinking places
Other services (except public administration)
811: repair and maintenance; 812: personal and laundry services; 813: religious, grantmaking, civic, professional, and similar organizations; 814: private households
Public administration
921: executive, legislative, and other general government support; 922: justice, public order, and safety activities; 923: administration of human resource programs; 924: administration of environmental quality programs; 925: administration of housing programs, urban planning, and community development; 926: administration of
economic programs; 927: space research and technology; 928: national security and international affairs
Note: c1 through c35 represent WIOD classifications and the first row represents NAICS. ; Source: United Nations Statistics Division.
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WIOD Construction
The construction of WIOD is extensive and its methodology is described by Diet-
zenbacher, Los, Stehrer, Timmer, and De Vries (2013) and Timmer, Dietzenbacher,
Los, Stehrer, and Vries (2015). An illustration of the WIOD time series creation from
their work as it relates to data used in this paper follows.
WIOD construction occurs through the creation of input-output tables for coun-
tries at specific points in time. Building the WIOD requires data from national ac-
counts (NA), international trade statistics (ITS), and supply and use tables (SUTs).
Data from NA and ITS are available at regular intervals and contain country-specific
publicly available information. NA commonly consists of data on aggregate imports
and exports, sectoral value-added and output, and a country’s final demand for a
product. ITS, such as UN Comtrade or IMF trade statistics, contains formal bilat-
eral trade data of goods and services.
Price Conversion
By combining bilateral trade and country use tables, one can derive the shares of
imports used for production for each product in a specific country. Use tables are
denominated in purchasers’ prices although supply tables are denominated in basic
prices (i.e. the prices reflected as the cost to producer). Accordingly, use table data
needs to be converted to basic prices. This is done through the creation of a valua-
tion matrix that contains trade and transportation margins as well as taxes, driving a
wedge between the amount paid by the purchaser and the cost to the producer. This
is information also contained in SUTs when available. After conversion, the SUTs
are both measured in basic prices. From the use table converted to basic prices, by
using industry demand from NA one can obtain a domestic use table. Also from
the use table at basic prices, by using the bilateral shares of imports for use one can
determine the import use from each country. These last two are what is needed to
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create the input-output table for each country.
Creation of Time Series
An unfortunate shortcoming of WIOD is the need to interpolate SUTs as they
are available intermittently across countries and across time. This makes creating a
time series impossible without interpolation because construction requires data from
NA, ITS, and SUTs. The SUTs aid in the creation of country input-output tables
and subsequently world input-output tables. The interpolation process is described
by Timmer, Dietzenbacher, Los, Stehrer, and Vries (2015), where they also highlight
that U.S. has annual SUTs from 1998-2010 although Mexico, Russia, and Cyprus only
have SUTs for one year. Several EU countries and the BEA have begun releasing
annual SUTs with revisions which will allay the need to interpolate as much in the
future.
To impute the SUT coefficients, WIOD uses the RAS method as in Temurshoev
and Timmer (2011) and described for WIOD by Dietzenbacher, Los, Stehrer, Tim-
mer, and De Vries (2013). At a given point of time for each country, there is available
information from NA, such as aggregate industrial production, imports, exports, in-
ventories, and taxes. A country’s aggregated value-added, sector-level value-added,
and aggregated final use is also available regularly. As a preliminary step, the sec-
tor measures of imports, exports, inventories, taxes, and trade and transportation
margins are estimated.
The SUTs are interpolated using the RAS method. In rudimentary form and
focusing only on supply and use for sectors, the method is rather simple. Given that
aggregated supply and use data exists, the estimates of the sectoral supply and use
data can be updated based on aggregate supply and use information. Suppose that
for a country the SUTs are available in 2000 and 2002 but missing for 2001. In 2001,
total supply and total use by sector are known but the contributions to and from each
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sector are unknown. Tables A.9 and A.10 show the process of estimating the SUT for
2001. This is an iterative process starting with the last known SUT and updating the
weights based on estimated sectoral totals relative to actual sectoral totals for total
supply and then for total use and so on. In this example, there will be an estimate
of the SUT for 2001 using the 2000 SUT table as a starting guess. The same will be
done using the next available SUT, which is 2002. Following the same process there
are two estimates of the SUT for 2001 of which WIOD uses the simple average. Table
A.10 shows a simple example of this method using the 2000 SUT as a starting guess.
Table A.9: Sample SUT with Missing Data
2000 Use
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Actual supply
Supply Sector 1 a b c (a+b+c)
Sector 2 d e f (d+e+f)
Sector 3 g h i (g+h+i))
Actual use (a+d+g) (b+e+h) (c+f+i)
2001 Use
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Actual supply
Supply Sector 1 unknown unknown unknown known
Sector 2 unknown unknown unknown known
Sector 3 unknown unknown unknown known
Actual use known known known
2002 Use
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Actual supply
Supply Sector 1 j k l (j+k+l)
Sector 2 m n o (m+n+o)
Sector 3 p q r (p+q+r)
Actual use (j+m+p) (k+n+q) (l+o+r)
Note: This is a sample WIOD with missing data for 2001.
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Table A.10: Estimation of SUT for 2001
Step 1 Use
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Estimated supply Actual supply
Supply Sector 1 a b c (a+b+c) S1
Sector 2 d e f (d+e+f) S2
Sector 3 g h i (g+h+i) S3
Estimated use (a+d+g) (b+e+h) (c+f+i)
Actual use U1 U2 U2
Step 2 Use
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Estimated supply Actual supply
Supply Sector 1 a×S1(a+b+c) = SU11
b×S1
(a+b+c) = SU12
c×S1
(a+b+c) = SU13 (SU11+SU12+SU13) S1
Sector 2 d×S2(d+e+f) = SU21
e×S2
(d+e+f) = SU22
f×S2
(d+e+f) = SU23 (SU21+SU22+SU23) S2
Sector 3 g×S2(g+h+i) = SU31
h×S2
(g+h+i) = SU32
i×S2
(g+h+i) = SU33 (SU31+SU32+SU33)) S3
Estimated use (SU11+SU21+SU31) (SU12+SU22+SU32) (SU13+SU23+SU33)
Actual use U1 U2 U2
Step 3 Use
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3
Supply Sector 1 SU11×U1(SU11+SU21+SU31)
SU12×U1
(SU12+SU22+SU32)
SU13×U1
(SU13+SU23+SU33)
Sector 2 SU21×U1(SU11+SU21+SU31)
SU22×U1
(SU12+SU22+SU32)
SU23×U1
(SU13+SU23+SU33)
Sector 3 SU31×U1(SU11+SU21+SU31)
SU32×U1
(SU12+SU22+SU32)
SU33×U1
(SU13+SU23+SU33)
and iterate...
Note: This is a sample WIOD with missing data for 2001 highlighting the iteration process.
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